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I. LAW IN TIME
A. The Problem
Over a long period, simple societies achieved social stability as social
stasis through normative inertia.1 Conversely, high-complexity2 societies
Associate Professor of Law, Boston College Law School. I gratefully acknowledge the outstanding
assistance of Deepika Kommineni and the support of the Boston College Law School Fund.
1. Note two points here. First, the obvious distinction between stability and stasis. The achievement of
stability by high-complexity societies was only possible by doing away with stasis. Relatedly, social
stability and instability and normative inertia and change are spectrum phenomena. Whenever they are
mentioned, the qualifications “relative” or “sufficient” are implicit. Second, and implicit in the causal
structure of the phrase footnoted here, society is norms through and through.
2. If we translate “elements” into “systems”, systems theory is unusually helpful in identifying the
tipping-point phenomenon in question: “evolution . . . does not halt the growth of systems at the point
from which it is no longer possible to connect every element with every other element at any time. . . .
The key distinction is now between systems with complete interconnection between elements and those
with only selective interconnection; and the real systems of the evolved world are obviously to be found
on the latter side of the distinction. In brief, the form of complexity is hence the necessity to sustain an
only selective connection between elements, in other words, the selective organization of the system’s
autopoiesis.” 1 NIKLAS LUHMANN, THEORY OF SOCIETY, 79-80 (Rhodes Barrett trans., Stanford Univ.
Press 2012). The approach to complexity that remains largely implicit in this Article is otherwise
markedly distinct from systems theory analysis of complexity in general and law’s complexity, as an
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achieve—when they do—social stability as constant functional adaptation
and axiological responsiveness through small quotidian and large
occasional normative changes.3
Stability is a sociological concept. Order is a normative one. Order
denotes stability normatively produced and sustained. As a normative
concept, order is susceptible to further normative specifications in terms of,
e. g., sacredness or profanity, authenticity or inauthenticity, justice or
injustice.
Order in simple societies is the result of normative inertia, while order in
high-complexity societies is brought about by constant normative change.
4 To understand order in both types of societies is to begin to understand the
question of law in time.
For the argument of this Article, the concept of high-complexity societies
requires no more than a working definition. Societies are complex by virtue
of their demographic, economic, institutional, cultural, political,
geopolitical, cognitive, technological, self-referential, and communicative
elements each reaching both qualitative and quantitative thresholds. The
specification of these thresholds is constrained only by rational persuasion
in the context of the complexity model that incorporates them. The moment
these elements all reach their respective thresholds, their interrelationship
activates the transformation in societal type from complex to highly
complex, with significant implications for social order.
Not all high-complexity societies develop legal systems. In those that do,5
“emergent” and “self-organizing” system, in particular. In addition to Luhmann’s work, see the essays
collected in JAMIE MURRAY, COMPLEXITY THEORY AND LAW: MAPPING AN EMERGENT
JURISPRUDENCE (Thomas E. Webb & Steven Wheatley eds., 2019).
3. This question may be asked from within normative orders. In a classical example, “how is it possible
for there to exist over time a just and stable society of free and equal citizens who still remain profoundly
divided by reasonable religious, philosophical, and moral doctrines?” JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL
LIBERALISM (1999). For an incisive argument about how “reasonability” anchors the central theses of
Rawls’ novel liberal approach to his question see David Rasmussen, Defending Reasonability: The
Centrality of Reasonability in the Later Rawls, 30 Phil. & Soc. Criticism 5-6 (2004). In the conceptual
framework presented below, legal liberalism is an enclosed-diachronic type of legal thought. Note also
the discussion at the end of the problem of “reflection versus commitment.” On the responsiveness of
legal orders, see Vlad Perju,Cosmopolitanism and Constitutional Self-Government, in 8 INT’L J. CONST.
L. 3 (2010).
4. Conservatism and progressivism are clusters of political intuitions, sensibilities, and attitudes
intelligible only against a background of social order. That order is a primary social good necessary for
the achievement and enjoyment of other goods tends to remain opaque to progressives, while
conservatives fail to understand that constant progress is what order requires in high complexity
societies. That conservatism and progressivism will remain politically relevant in high complexity
societies does not make them less sociologically and normatively immature.
5. See, for the preeminent comparative historical analysis of the evolutionary path from “customary
law” through “bureaucratic law” into “legal systems,” ROBERTO MANGABEIRA UNGER, LAW IN
MODERN SOCIETY: TOWARD ACRITICISM OF SOCIAL THEORY (1977), and, for extended analyses of the
concept of legal systems, HANSKELSEN, PURETHEORY OFLAW (Max Knight trans., Univ. of Cal. Press
1967); H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW (2012); JOSEPH RAZ, THE CONCEPT OF A LEGAL SYSTEM
(1980); NOBERTO BOBBIO, DALLA STRUTTURA ALLA FUNZIONE: NUOVE STUDI DI TEORIA DEL
DIRITTO (Laterza ed., 2007). For adjudication as part of legal systems, see the classics RONALD
DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE (1986); and DUNCAN KENNEDY, A CRITIQUE OF ADJUDICATION (FIN DE
2
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ever-larger expanses of social normativity are institutionalized as law. 6
Also institutionalized as law7 in those societies are adaptive responses to
coordination problems themselves, which are largely created by
complexification itself. This both normative and adaptive
institutionalization process connects the universality of law as an institution
to law’s expansionist voracity.8
There is no single formal source of law that consistently predominates in
the process of normative and adaptive institutionalization. It varies. For
example, citizens’ disillusionment with representative government may
channel their demands to the judiciary, giving this branch the lead in the
process of institutionalization of not-yet-institutionalized normativity as
well as of managerial solutions.9 In any event, law responds with gulping
voracity to aspiration as well as adaptation.
Thus, in the ongoing institutionalization of normativity and adaptability,
social stability as constant normative change is as much a sociological as it
is an ethical achievement of legal systems.
The sociological feat is obvious: the production of social cohesion over
time for large populations. The ethical achievement lies in the fact that
while real or perceived social coordination problems raise tail-wind
pressures for functional adaptation, axiological orientations call on values10
to inform the attitude and behavior of legal actors involved in functional
adaptation. The impact of values takes the form at times of a blazing edge
steering the direction of functional adaptation, at other times of sources
themselves of social pressures in the form of legitimacy challenges or
crises.11 Equally important is the fact that any steering by values is already
in some degree present in the value-laden mediation of legal actors’
diagnosis as well as their response to adaptation pressures. Hence, if in their
SIECLE) (1998).
6. In an example, in a brilliant study of “trust among strangers” in the context of large demographic,
economic and urban changes in a rapidly complexifying Britain, Penelope Ismay shows how
intermediary civil associations adapted to develop notions and embody practices of collective
responsibility (“of who owes what to whom and why”). The normative kernel of those notions and
practices was in time voraciously institutionalized by British welfare law. See PENELOPE ISMAY, TRUST
AMONG STRANGERS: FRIENDLY SOCIETIES INMODERN BRITAIN (2018).
7. Institutions channel behavior into transtemporal patterns.
8. Of the phenomenon of law’s constant expansion, Hayek saw only the dimension of its functional
adaptation through pressure groups influence, therefore missing the independent weight of its
axiological component. 1-3 FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, LAW, LEGISLATION, AND LIBERTY (1978-81). This
oversight has plagued the schools of legal, economic and political thought influenced by him.
9. For insightful analysis of this process in a high-energy democracy, see LUIS ROBERTO BARROSO, A
JUDICIALIZACAODAVIDA EO PAPELDO SUPREMO TRIBUNAL FEDERAL, 45 (2018). See also 240 ANA
PAULA DE BARCELLOS, NEOCONSTITUCIONALISMO, DIREITOS FUNDAMENTAIS E CONTROLE DAS
POLITICAS PUBLICAS, 83-103 (Direito Administrativo ed., 2005); MALCOLMM. FEELEY&EDWARD L.
RUBIN, JUDICIAL POLICYMAKING AND THEMODERN STATE (2000).
10. This framework rejects as reductionist and distorting efficiency-based approaches to the “evolution”
of common law, from Ronald Coase to Richard Posner and beyond.
11. See groundbreaking analysis in JURGEN HABERMAS, LEGITIMATION CRISIS (Thomas McCarthy
transl., Beacon Press 1975).
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long historical arc it seems that the legal systems of high-complexity
societies move in the direction of certain ideals,12 it is because they do.
Ultimately, though, legal systems are able to constitute the type of order
characterized by social stability as constant normative change only
inasmuch as legal actors internalize, act out and act upon a paradigm of law
in a way that smooths out inescapable and irreducible functional-axiological
tensions.
I say more about paradigms in Subsection 2(C). For now, assume that it
is through the operation of paradigms of legal thought that legal systems
can be the vessels in which adaptation and aspiration fare a chance of
travelling together through time in the form of law.13 And as the law of high
complexity societies unfolds in time, it is only because of paradigms of legal
thought that legal systems are able to assume what is often referred to as
their autopoietic—significantly self-referential, self-reproducing, and self-
validating—and autotelic (formalist) capabilities. The upshot for legal
historians is that any kind of legal history fails adequately to account for the
viewpoint of legal actors unless it incorporates in its narrative the way in
which paradigms shape thoughts and attitudes.
§
Now, even this précis of a theory of law in time already burdens legal
history in important ways. If we define the history of law as the narrative-
structured,14 retrospective,15 diachronic explanation of law in time, what
epistemological, ontological and stability/change models set legal history
apart frommere stories about law, as both take on the retrospective narrative
form that has law as its object? Unaided by a general theory of the nature of
law and its evolution, what justifiable basis is there for setting those
standards? What basis is there for selecting the ideas, sources, institutions,
actors, and events16 in social stability and instability and in normative inertia
12. Of course, the ideals of liberal, democratic, and capitalist societies do not exhaust the constellation
of ideals that have animated high-complexity societies, even those that eventually developed legal
systems.
13. Realization of the inescapable, and ultimately irreducible, tension between adaptation and aspiration
goes back to Weber and, before him, to Hegel and Hobbes. The 1970’s saw important liberal and critical
work on the dialectic of functions and values. See, among several, JOHNRAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE
(1971); Duncan Kennedy, Legal Formality, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 351 (1973); JURGEN HABERMAS,
LEGITIMATION CRISIS (1973); ROBERTO MANGABEIRA UNGER, KNOWLEDGE AND POLITICS (1975);
UNGER, supra note 5; and David M. Trubek, Complexity and Contradiction in the Legal Order: Balbus
and the Challenge of Critical Social Thought about Law, in 11 LAW&SOC’Y REV. 529 (3d ed. 1977).
14. For a collection of interventions in the controversies on history and/as narrative, see THE HISTORY
ANDNARRATIVE READER (Geoffrey Roberts ed., 2001).
15. This is not a pleonasm, as prospective explanations are also diachronic.
16. “Event” is not used here to mean being subject to causality as opposed to being subject to reason, as
in Collingwood’s distinction between event and action. Events here mean primarily human engendered
occurrences deemed to cause one of the dents in the fabric of human affairs by which we measure time.
See R. G. COLLINGWOOD, THE IDEA OF HISTORY (1994). The same point can be made in Dilthey’s
4
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and change that make up the materials of the history of law as distinguished
from the elements of the history of something else? What basis is there for
the detection and identification of paradigms of legal thought, and for the
explanation of their content and operation? Furthermore, as previous legal
history is itself an object of historical inquiry,17 each generation of
historians writes, in endless revisionisms, its own retrospective diachronic
narrative about the legal historical narratives of preceding generations.
Thus, what justifiable basis is there for the purported rectifications of
revisionism without the aid of a general theory?
The threshold question for the legal history of high-complexity societies
is, therefore, this: what conception of the nature and evolution of law
supports its selection and interpretation of legal materials, institutions,
events, conducts and attitudes?18
Furthermore, how legal actors interface with legal historiography raises
an independent jurisprudential question: what role does the discipline of
legal history play in the evolution of law? More specifically, what role does
legal history, including critical legal history,19 play in the social order of
high complexity societies?
While legal historians are charged with the reflective adoption of an
answer to legal history’s threshold question, they may well remain
unencumbered by the question of the role legal history plays in the evolution
of law. Hence this Article prioritizes the first question, that is, on legal
theory for legal history. Only secondarily does it address the question of
legal history’s evolutionary role.
§
This Article makes use of connected premises of theoretical construction.
The first premise is that law is the one universal institution, for there is no
individual who is not a legal person and no planetary space that is not a legal
terms: events are expressions of human experience deemed important, the proper account of which is
by reconstructing in the thought of the historian the experience—made available by verstehen—of the
actors of the event. See WILHELMDILTHEY, HERMENEUTICS AND THE STUDY OFHISTORY 4 (Rudolf A.
Makkreel and Frijhthof Rodi eds., 1996).
17. See, as examples of histories of legal history, J. G. A. POCOCK, THE ANCIENT CONSTITUTION AND
THE FEUDAL LAW (1987); PETER STEIN, LEGAL EVOLUTION (2009); DONALD R. KELLY, THE HUMAN
MEASURE: SOCIAL THOUGHT IN THEWESTERN LEGAL TRADITION (1990).
18. Although clear already, later in this Article it will become clearer why and how the theory of the
nature and evolution of law that legal history ought to rely upon is nothing like the naïve “evolutionary
functionalism” critical legal history has attacked as underlying much of apologetic legal history. See
Robert W. Gordon, Critical Legal Histories, 36 STAN. L. REV. 57, (1984) as republished in ROBERTW.
GORDON, TAMING THE PAST: ESSAYS ON LAW INHISTORY ANDHISTORY IN LAW (2017).
19. Critique may come from conservative as well as progressive camps, both of which are well
represented in modern historiography. The ideal of critical legal history that inspires this Article refers
however to a historiography preoccupied with its conditions of epistemic possibility as well as with
denouncing justificatory practices that have not earned their persuasiveness in favor of structures and
practices of domination and exclusion.
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space, and no person or space is outside the law. This no other institution
can match. And as domestic legal systems connect to each other
transnationally and to the system of international law in inextricable myriad
ways, the connectivity of law furthers its universality. Therefore, legal
history, even that which focuses on topics parochial in space or in time,20
touches a dimension of the universal.21 We must add to the universality of
legal history’s object the latent universalism of the historical narrative form
itself, whose explanatory scope would forever expand—as the web of
phenomenal relatedness is endlessly interwoven—were it not limited by
convention or by ontological or causal pre-commitments.
Thus, finding itself in the realm of the institutional and discursive
universal, legal history is gifted an equally universal epistemic opportunity:
that of explaining how the universal touches the historical ground, and is in
turn bounced back, reshaped, to the realm of the universal. But there too lies
a challenge that legal history shares with other areas of historiography.
Excluding the reconstruction of the enduring problematics of reason or for
geistesgeschichtlich histories of high thought,22 much of historiography
remains overwhelmed by the nation and the categories of nationalism,23
despite renewed calls, every couple of generations, for global, transnational,
deep or long-term history.24 Both apologetic and critical legal histories
commit this ideological sin of cognition. Therefore, a condition legal history
must meet in order to thrive in the realm of the universal while walking the
ground of particular manifestations is its methodological use of general
theories of the nature and evolution of lawwithout which that which touches
on everything everywhere (law) cannot be properly segregated for study
20. I explain what I mean by parochialism of space and time in Paulo Barrozo, Institutional Conditions
of Contemporary Legal Thought, in SEARCHING FOR CONTEMPORARY LEGAL THOUGHT (Christopher
Tomlins & Justin Desautels-Stein eds., 2017).
21. Even as history is methodologically concerned with objects concrete and particular, as contrasted to
abstract and universal. See COLLINGWOOD, supra note 16. Or even as legal history is conceived as
“remainder,” as recovering “traces” in the realm of “equivalents” that law creates. See Christopher
Tomlins, Why Law’s Objects do not Disappear, in ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK OF LAW AND THEORY
(Andreas Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos ed., 2019). For a classical locus of critique of law’s creation of
equivalences at the cost of disembodying abstractions, see KarlMarx,On the Jewish Question, inMARX:
EARLY POLITICAL WRITINGS (Joseph O’Malley & Richard A. Davis trans., Cambridge Univ. Press
1994).
22. See, e.g., G. W. F. HEGEL, ELEMENTS OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT §§ 341-60 (1920). See, for a
helpful typology of history of thought, Richard Rorty, The Historiography of Philosophy: Four Genres,
in PHILOSOPHY IN HISTORY: ESSAYS IN THE HISTORIOGRAPHY OF PHILOSOPHY (Richard Rorty et al.
eds., 1984).
23. And with it the temptation of reading “the national past solely from an insider’s perspective.” AZIZ
RANA, THE TWO FACES OFAMERICAN FREEDOM 6 (2010).
24. Among the most recent (previous summons to “longue durée” and to “universal” history date back
to the 1950’s-1970’s), see JOGULDI&DAVID ARMITAGE, THE HISTORY OFMANIFESTO (2014) (and a
reaction to it in Markus Dubber, New Historical Jurisprudence: Legal History as Critical Analysis of
Law, in CRITICALANALYSIS OF LAW 2:1 (2015)); LYNNHUNT, WRITINGHISTORY IN THEGLOBAL ERA
(2015); JURGEN OSTERHAMMEL, THE TRANSFORMATION OF THEWORLD: A GLOBAL HISTORY OF THE
NINETEENTHCENTURY (Patrick Camiller trans., Princeton Univ. Press 2015); and SEBASTIANCONRAD,
WHAT ISGLOBALHISTORY? (2016).
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from what is touched by it.25
The second premise is that determinations of historiographical relevance
are unavoidable. The only question is the degree to which they are
justifiable.
To see those determinations as unavoidable it to disavow the view of legal
history as the assembly of a diachronic puzzle that is epistemologically and
ontologically framed by mind-independent time, causation and events of
law. Because, rather, law’s time, causation and events are constituted as
such and measured by how jurists and legal historians select from the
unrecoverable entirety of the past the ideas, paradigms, sources, institutions,
actors, attitudes, and events that legal history narratively weaves together in
present meaning and intelligibility.26
Augustine’s arcane insight on the grasping of time only by virtue of the
mental appropriation of events in time is illuminating here: “‘Tis in thee, O
my mind, that I measure my times. . . . The impression, which things
passing by cause in thee, and remains even when the things are gone, that
is it which being still present, I do measure: not the things which have
passed by that this impression might be made.”27 The upshot here is that the
selectivity of past events is both unavoidable and constitutive of the very
diachronicity of legal history.28 The only concern is whether determinations
of historiographical relevance by legal history are grounded on a theory of
the nature and evolution of law. When it is not, legal history risks
dilettantism.
This is not to say that dilettante legal history is unimportant or
25. Except for specific, sage, or record-setting history. Several examples of record-setting legal history
come to mind: VICTOR FARIAS, HEIDEGGER E LENAZISME (1987); KEILAGRINBERG, LIBERATA, A LEI
DA AMBIGUIDADE: AS ACOES DE LIBERDADE DA CORTE DE APELACAO DO RIO DE JANEIRO NO
SECULOXIX (1994); Mary S. Bilder, The Corporate Origins of Judicial Review, 3 YALEL.J. 116 (2006)
and MARY S. BILDER, MADISON’S HAND: REVISING THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION (2017);
DANIEL KANSTROOM, DEPORTATION NATION: OUTSIDERS IN AMERICAN HISTORY (2010); William E.
Forbath, The Long Life of Liberal America: Law and State-Building in England and the U.S., 24 LAW
& HIST. REV. 179 (2006); Daniela Caruso & Joanna Geneve, Trade and History: The Case of EU-
Algeria Relations, 1 B. U. INT’L L.J. 33 (2015); and AMALIA D. KESSLER, INVENTING AMERICAN
EXCEPTIONALISM: THE ORIGINS OF AMERICAN ADVERSARIAL LEGAL CULTURE, 1800-1877 (2017).
Even specific legal history focused on the far past may open a keyhole through which to see aspects of
the universal or the sempiternal. See Adrian Vermeule & Adriaan Lanni, Precautionary
Constitutionalism in Ancient Athens, 34 CARDOZO L. REV. 893 (2013).
26. For an influential typology of narrative motivations, see HAYDEN WHITE, METAHISTORY: THE
HISTORICAL IMAGINATION IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY EUROPE (2014). A typology of historical
frameworks offered to an audience of legal historians appears in Chapter 8 of REINHART
KOSELLECK, SEDIMENTS OF TIME: ON POSSIBLE HISTORIES (2018).Typologies of kinds of
history are classically offered by Hegel and Nietzsche. See, respectively, G. W. F. HEGEL, THE
PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY (J. Sibree Trans., Prometheus 1991) (1837); and FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE, ON
THEUSE ANDDISADVANTAGE OFHISTORY FOR LIFE (Peter Preuss trans., Hackett 1980) (1873).
27. AUGUSTINE, CONFESSIONS, 273-274 (William Watts trans., Harvard U. Press 2006). Collingwood
made the same point that the past no longer exists and the historian in a way studies the present, that is,
traces in the present of the bygone, and from those traces builds narratives reconstructing the past. See
COLLINGWOOD, supra note 16.
28. Selectivity of the past is rooted in the limits of cognition as well as in data access. That’s what makes
the selectivity unavoidable.
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uninteresting. As it will be shown below, legal history plays an important
legal evolutionary role independently of its theoretical grounding.
Furthermore, the humanistic, intimate, and personal-sage role that history
often assumes for individuals in general ought not to be discounted.29
Neither is it to say that legal history fails unless it adopts a full-fledged
theory of stability/change beyond its ordinary reliance on the antecedent-
ensuing mold of historical prose.30 But grand legal history does require
theoretical criteria minimally to sustain actor-focused interpretations and
for sorting out the most relevant from the most irrelevant in its selectivity
of the past.
Theoretically grounded determinations of historiographical relevance are
especially important for modern critical historiography, for to reveal the
justifiably relevant that has failed to be selected by apologetic
historiography—and is therefore silenced—is one of its motifs, from
Rousseau to Foucault.31 In any event, the second premise of the overall
argument of this Article is that legal history is written from a present from
which the past is reconstructed. This reconstruction is selective, and the
selection should be well informed by a theory of the nature and evolution
of law.
The third premise of the overall argument of this Article is that any
account of the nature and evolution of law is fundamentally a conceptual
enterprise. It is so not just because intelligibility at the level of theory
construction thus requires. Conceptualism is required not only for
intelligibility during theory construction, but also by the fact that legal
actors orientate and operate in the world through concepts. Consequently,
the selectivity of the past that history cannot avoid is ineludibly also about
concepts and is undertaken through conceptual lenses. Historians eventually
find that structured narratives that refer to objects outside the narrative can
29. In the words of a great humanist, “No reality is more essential to our self-awareness than history. It
shows us the broadest horizons of mankind, brings us the contents of tradition upon which our life is
built, shows us standards by which to measure the present, frees us from unconscious bondage to our
own age, teaches us to see man in his highest potentialities and his imperishable creations. We can make
no better use of leisure than to familiarize ourselves and keep ourselves familiar with the glories of the
past and the catastrophes in which everything has been shattered. . . . Our lives become richer and past
and present illumine one another.” KARL JASPERS, WAY TO WISDOM: AN INTRODUCTION TO
PHILOSOPHY (R. Manheim trans., Yale Univ. Press 1954) (1951). Another master humanist—this one
writing from deep into the camp of history—reminded us that “What is it, exactly, that constitutes the
legitimacy of an intellectual endeavor? . . . Even were history obliged to be eternally indifferent to homo
faber or to homo politicus, it would be sufficiently justified by its necessity for the full flowering of
homo sapiens.” MARC BLOCH, THE HISTORIAN’S CRAFT 8 (2004). The only point here, again, is that
should legal history aspire to a certain scholarly rigor, it ought to find its legal theoretical foundation.
30. For the view that it does, see Christopher Tomlins, After Critical Legal History: Scope, Scale,
Structure, in 8 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 31 (2012). For reflection, from a hermeneutical perspective,
on the conditions of possibility of historical knowledge, see DILTHEY, supra note 16, and MICHAEL
OAKESHOTT, ONHISTORY ANDOTHER ESSAYS (1999).
31. And also the deeply wise DAVID LUBAN, LEGAL MODERNISM: LAW, MEANING, AND VIOLENCE
(1997).
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only do so intelligibility using concepts.32
However, conceptualism as I understand it is neither committed nor
reducible to innate concepts33 or to mere inductive or intuitive
classifications.34 Obviously anchored in the innate ability to create, acquire
and deploy concepts, conceptualism is best understood as the view that
concepts are vessels that transform the unmediated experiences of
consciousness into the possibility of logical thinking. In other words,
conceptualism transforms classical metaphysics into logic35 by prescribing
criteria for apperception of, and communication about, the world. After all,
semantics and semantic relationships are already inherently prescriptive.36
In this regard, concepts are not just pre-conditions of intelligibility, but
constitute intelligibility itself. Reality is intelligible as concepts and
relations between concepts.37 This is the general point that I take Hegel to
be making when he says that “the concept is . . . this absolute unity of being
and reflection whereby being-in-and-for-itself only is by being equally
reflection or positedness and positedness only is by being in-and-for-
32. Conceptual deprivation is therefore an acute form of deprivation. Consider, for example, the damage
caused to clear thinking as well as to legal and political life by the deprivation of sustained work on
concepts such as state, budget or public office in the American traditions of jurisprudence and legal
history.
33. Such as those identified by Kant. IMMANUEL KANT, CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON (Paul Guyer &
Allen W. Wood trans., Cambridge Univ. Press, 1999) (1781).
34. Of the Oxford jurisprudence orientation, from H. L. A. Hart to John Gardner, but also of the
sophisticated interdisciplinary orientation of, for example, Nicola Lacey, see HART, supra note 5 and
H. L. A. HART, THE AUTHORITY OF LAW: ESSAYS ON LAW AND MORALITY (2009); JOHN GARDNER,
LAW AS ALEAP OF FAITH (2012); Nicola Lacey, Analytical Jurisprudence versus Descriptive Sociology
Revisited, 84 TEX. L. REV. 945 (2006) and NICOLA LACY, IN SEARCH OF CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY
(2016).
35. See the reconstructions of Hegel’s Logic in ROBERT B. PIPPIN, HEGEL’S REALM OF SHADOWS
(2019).
36. See HILARY PUTNAM, RENEWING PHILOSOPHY (1992). Distilling Kant for inferential pragmatic
purposes, Robert Brandom speaks of “the understanding, the conceptual faculty, [as] the faculty of
grasping rules—of appreciating the distinction between correct and incorrect application they
determine.” Such rules are mostly implicit but never absent in inferential discourse, which then emerge
as the normative practice that it is. “The structure of those practices can be elucidated, but always from
within normative space, from within our normative practices of giving and asking for reasons.” The
logical labor of conceptualism is, in large part, that of increasingly “making explicit the implicit structure
characteristic of discursive practice as such.” ROBERTB.BRANDOM,MAKING ITEXPLICIT 8, 649 (1998).
A convergent point about the inherent rationality claims of speech is made systematically in 1 JURGEN
HABERMAS, THEORY OF COMMUNICATIVE ACTION: REASON AND THE RATIONALIZATION OF SOCIETY
(T. McCarthy trans., Beacon Press, 1985). Writing from the viewpoint of jurisprudence, Neil
MacCormick postulated that in virtue of human nature we are “norm-users.” See NEILMACCORMICK,
INSTITUTIONSOF LAW (2009).
37. See further, and fromwidely different approaches, the “Second Part” of IMMANUELKANT, CRITIQUE
OF THE POWER OF JUDGEMENT (Paul Guyer & Eric Matthews trans., Cambridge Univ. Press, 2006); G.
W. F. HEGEL, THE SCIENCE OF LOGIC (George Di Giovanni trans., Cambridge Univ. Press, 2015) &
Elements of the Philosophy of Right. Op. Cit.; Duncan Kennedy, The Structure of Blackstone’s
Commentaries, 28 BUFF. L. REV. 205 (1979); Pierre Schlag, The Aesthetics of American Law, 115
HARV. L. REV. 4 (2002); Jules Coleman & Jody Kraus, Rethinking the Theory of Legal Rights, 95 YALE
L.J. 7 (1986); Robert B. Pippin, In What Sense is Hegel’s Philosophy of Right ‘Based’ on His Science
of Logic? Remarks on the Logic of Justice, in HEGEL’S POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY (T. Brooks & S. Stein
eds., Oxford Univ. Press, 2017); Charles Barzun, Legal Rights and the Limits of Conceptual Analysis,
in 26 RATIO JURIS 215 (2013).
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itself.”38 An ancillary question about concepts that the theory of the nature
and evolution of law outlined in this article takes no position on is whether
concepts exhaust, without residues, intelligibility.39 Whatever position one
takes on this question, it is certainly the case that intelligibility is not
reducible to successfully adapted or strategic comportment, including
practical or cognitive adaptive comportment.
§
The Article will now proceed in three Sections. The remainder of Section
1 develops a typology of legal explanations, with focus on grand legal
history and theory of legal evolution. The purpose of this Section is to show
that full realization of the former’s explanatory potential depends on its
finding support in the latter. Section 2 outlines core elements of a theory of
the nature and evolution of law suited to provide that support for legal
history. That outline incidentally explains the role of legal history in the
evolution of law. Section 3 concludes the overall argument.
B. Types of Legal Explanation
Explanations in law can be analytically distinguished into a typology.40
Ideal-typically, but seldom as practiced, they differ in viewpoint and
scope—enclosed or enclosing — and in timeframe — synchronic or
diachronic. In legal evolution, as Section 2 shows, much hinges on the
dynamic between enclosed and enclosing, synchronic and diachronic
explanations.
Enclosed legal explanation is cabined within the point of view of actors
as actors of legal systems who seek to positionally create, develop, deploy,
expound, or explain the formal sources of law and their institutions. For our
purposes, two subtypes of enclosed explanation matter most: specific legal
history and legal doctrine.
Punctual legal history is that which is parochial in space or in time. It is
often concerned with one topic, one type or source, or with tracking doctrine
in time.
Legal doctrine is the tradition of discourse that conceptually organizes—
by synthetizing that which is disperse and analyzing that which is
clustered— legal sources in ways that incorporate the history of the relevant
38. See HEGEL, supra note 35, at 12 (of the Logic in the Gesammelte Werke), italics omitted.
39. For a view that cognitive experience has no “non-conceptual content,” see JOHNMCDOWELL, MIND
ANDWORLD (1994).
40. Compare and contrast the typology presented in this Article with the generous and helpful Martha
Minow’s underground Fieldguide eventually published as Martha Minow, Archetypal Legal
Scholarship: A Field Guide, in 63 J. LEGAL EDUC. 65 (2013) and with the compelling argument against
thinking about law in terms of the strict inside/outside “dichotomy” in Charles Barzun, Inside/Out:
Beyond the Internal/External Distinction in Legal Scholarship, 101 VA. L. REV. 5 (2015).
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concepts, use of institutional idioms and customs, processing of functional
demands, and infusion of values.41 In its historical dimension, doctrine
engages in historical analysis of law as distinguishable from punctual legal
history. Doctrine is the predominant form of discourse adopted by anyone
whose action orientation—by profession or circumstances—is legal. More
so than in any other type of legal explanation, it is in the intellectual and
discursive vessel of doctrine that the form of law—and legal formalism—
ordinarily travels.42
Conversely, enclosing legal thought theorizes the origins, logic,
functions, value, structuration, meaning, or evolution of law, including legal
actors’ enclosed orientation. Enclosing legal explanation admits several
subtypes. For our purposes, I focus on two of them: grand legal history and
theory of the nature and evolution of law.
Enclosed and enclosing explanations may privilege either law’s
synchronic or diachronic dimensions. Synchronic explanations focus on
time-undilated features of legal phenomena, including legal doctrine, and
whether a phenomenon is temporally placed in the past, present, or future.
Diachronic explanations focus instead on time-dilated features of legal
phenomena so that one phenomenon P1 is at least in part explained in light
of another phenomenon P2 placed in P1’s past or future.
Enclosed-synchronic legal doctrine and enclosed-diachronic punctual
legal history are dependent on paradigms of legal thought (to the idea of
which I return briefly at the end of this Subsection and then in greater detail
in Subsection 2. C.) for their possibility. Less obvious but not less true is
that several types of enclosing legal explanation, including that of most
schools of contemporary jurisprudence, also rest on paradigms of law for
their plausibility and intelligibility.
§
Keep in mind that this typology is not one of types of legal mind, but
rather one of types of explanations that legal minds produce. Aquinas,
Bacon, Kant, Savigny, Hegel, Jhering and Holmes all authored doctrinal
explanations in addition to other types of explanation they are best known
41. This broader definition benefitted from reflection upon this one: “Legal doctrines do not fulfill their
synthesizing function simply by conjoining pre-existing legal rules. Nor do they invent legal rules.
Rather, they redescribe a particular legal area in order to provide a clearer context in which legal rules
can operate. As a result, there are two requirements for determining the value of a doctrinal theory. The
first is its ability to mirror intuitions about the just resolution of legal cases. The second is its ability to
provide simplicity and clarity to a particular area of law. Specifically, does it describe the landscape in
such a way that the use of a few rules will result in relatively determinate outcomes.” Catharine P. Wells,
Langdell and the Invention of Legal Doctrine, 58 BUFF. L. REV. 551, 617 (2010).
42. This point about doctrine and the form of law requires further specification, especially so in light of
the two examples of legal history in Subsection 1.C below. That specification will have to wait until
Section 2(C), though.
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for.
In any event, the typology may be spatially represented in a graph
showing the three axes of viewpoint, scope, and timeframe. Closest to the
vertex, we find enclosed-synchronic everyday doctrine; next along the
timeframe axis, we find the enclosed-diachronic explanation characteristic
of, say, interpretive accounts of legal doctrines, sources, institutions, and
events that rely on their unfolding over time in the way they are as law or
legal argument. For example, such an enclosed diachronic explanation
would interpret a line of judicial precedents in order to make a historical
analysis of legal argument. The same space in the graph contains punctual
legal history. Now moving along the space formed by the viewpoint and
scope lines, we meet enclosing-synchronic accounts of the nature or
function of legal language, sources, institutions, doctrines, and actors
exemplified by analytical jurisprudence,43 law and economics, and law and
society. Finally, moving further along the three lines, we find enclosing-
diachronic legal explanation characteristic of grand legal history and of
theoretical explanations that connect the nature of law to its evolution.
Note that the graph would show no limits in principle to continued
enhancement of explanatory capabilities within types; but only with regard
to enclosing-diachronic theoretical explanations that connect the nature of
law to its evolution would the graph predict unlimited expansion of
explanatory powers.44
§
Noteworthy also is that the relationships between types of legal
explanation tend to be obscured by the practice of thinking within them. In
one example of obfuscation, everyday legal doctrine tends to veil its
dependency on intelligibility and communicability upon other types of legal
explanation. Another case in point of routine obfuscation is the object of
this article: grand legal history tends to obfuscate the extent to which it
presupposes theories of the nature and evolution of law, to disregard seeking
a coherent connection with one such theory, and in the process to become
oblivious of how it too fits in the large scheme of legal evolution. More will
be said on this later.
I referred to paradigms in this Subsection. An explanation of paradigms
is forthcoming in Section 2(C). For now, note that paradigms of legal
43. For an outstanding example, see Joseph Raz, Two Views of the Nature of the Theory of Law: A
Partial Comparison, in 4 LEGAL THEORY 249 (1998).
44. “Her look filled me with awe; her burning eyes penetrated more deeply than those of ordinary
men . . . It was difficult to say how tall she might be, for at one time she seemed to confine herself to
the ordinary measure of man, and at another the crown of her head touched the heavens . . . “ BOETHIUS,
THECONSOLATIONOF PHILOSOPHY 133 (Hugh Fraser Stewart, Edward Kennard Rand & S. Jim Tester
trans., Harv. Univ. Press, 1973).
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thought emerge and mature by moving and decanting through the types of
legal explanation. Both The Great Alliance and The Great Manifold
paradigms discussed below began by rising to the enclosing-diachronic
level of legal theory before percolating in legal thinking and discourse.45
C. History of Law as Diachronic Explanation
We now turn our attention to the mode of legal explanation of grand legal
history, a vibrant and prolific field of research and writing throughout the
world.46 While often engrossing, its explanatory powers are not to be taken
for granted. In large part, those powers turn on whether grand legal history
mindfully consults a suitable theory of the nature and evolution of law.
Failure of consultation, coupled with the risk of diminished explanatory
power, risks a category mistake: while believing a narrative to be a
contribution to enclosing-diachronic legal explanation, the historian is in
fact producing an enclosed-diachronic analysis of legal discourse and
practice, only every once in a while putting the narrative’s head above the
surface of the internal viewpoint.
Consider two examples of sweeping revisionist historical narrative,
which were selected for how much one learns from them and for how both
successfully avoid the category mistake risk by consistently keeping their
vistas outside their material of analysis, namely the enclosed legal
explanation favored by judges, lawyers, and treatise writers.47 The question
they raise for us is whether their explanatory promise might be enhanced by
a theory of the nature and evolution of law along the lines of the one
sketched in this Article.
Take, as the first example, a broad critical account of the rise of “legal
formalism” in the nineteenth century United States.48 According to this
class-conflict-based account, “one of the crucial choices made during the
antebellum period was to promote economic growth primarily through the
legal, not the tax system, a choice which had major consequences for the
45. To illustrate the point, consider that The Great Alliance paradigm achieved dominance in the mid-
nineteenth century as enclosing-diachronic legal thought and, by the end of that century, it had already
settled as enclosed legal explanation, by which point its dependency on enclosing-diachronic legal
thought was already largely obscured. Furthermore, in its first 150 years, the attractive and resilient
Great Alliance spread throughout the world as transplanted doctrine, law and economics, Kelsenian or
Hartian positivism, legal pragmatism and experimentalism, public law idealism, etc., before signs of its
exhaustion became as clear as they now are.
46. See, for example of both characteristics, the recent OXFORD HANDBOOK OF EUROPEAN LEGAL
HISTORY (Heikki Pihlajamaki, Markus D. Dubber &Mark Godfrey eds., Oxford Univ. Press 2018) and
OXFORDHANDBOOKOFLEGALHISTORY (Markus D. Dubber& Christopher Tomlins eds., Oxford Univ.
Press2018).
47. Any list of similar examples would have to include 1 & 2 HAROLD J. BERMAN, LAW AND
REVOLUTION (1983 & 2003) and FRANZWIEACKER, A HISTORY OF PRIVATE LAW IN EUROPE (Tony
Weir trans., Oxford Univ. Press, 1995).
48. MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OFAMERICAN LAW: 1780-1860 (1977).
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distribution of wealth and power in American society.”49 The historical
context from which legal formalism would rise was that of law before the
American Revolution, which reflected the (conceptually confused, I should
add) marriage of natural and customary law, being “conceived of as
protective, regulative, paternalistic and, above all, a paramount expression
of the moral sense of the community.”50 That would change over the
following several decades, in which “the major direction of common law
policy reflected the overthrow of eighteenth century precommercial and
antidevelopmental common law values.”51 Why? Because “as political and
economic power shifted to merchant and entrepreneurial groups in the
postrevolutionary period, they began to forge an alliance with the legal
profession to advance their own interests through a transformation of the
legal system. . . . This transformation in American law both aided and
ratified a major shift in power in an increasingly market-oriented society.”52
So much so that “by the middle of the nineteenth century the legal system
had been reshaped to the advantage of men of commerce and industry at the
expense of farmers, workers, consumers, and other less powerful groups
within the society.”53With the consequence that “not only had the law come
to establish legal doctrines that maintained the new distribution of economic
and political power, but, wherever it could, it actively promoted a legal
redistribution of wealth against the weakest groups in the society.”54 In this
account, the economic forces expressed as interests of specific social groups
provided the direction of change, and political power (in the hands of those
groups as never before) caused the changes. To enshrine the changes, the
narrative affirms that merchants, entrepreneurs, lawyers, judges, and jurists
resorted to “legal formalism” as the epiphenomenal idea, as the codifier of
an ontologically denser “alliance between intellect and power. . . . For the
paramount social condition that is necessary for legal formalism to flourish
in a society is for the powerful groups in that society to have a great interest
in disguising and suppressing the inevitably political and redistributive
functions of law.”55
This materialist56 account of the rise of formalism from the eighteenth to
the nineteenth centuries ventures not so much a concept as an approximate
specification of formalism as a “tendency . . . to seek higher levels of
generality and inclusiveness of legal doctrine [which] is one of the more
49. Id. at 15. Let us leave aside the incorrect differentiation of “law” from “tax system.”
50. Id. at 253.
51. Id. at 253.
52. Id. at 253.
53. Id. at 253.
54. Id. at 254.
55. Id. at 266.
56. Inverting the ideas and interest (passions) order—”one the warp, the other the woof of the vast arras-
web of Universal History”—as in Hegel. G. W. F. HEGEL, THE PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY 23 (J. Sibree
trans., Prometheus Books 1991) (1837).
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important characteristics associated with the development of legal
formalism.”57 Central to a “scientific” turn in law, formalism operated
“through classification of subjects [by which] it sought to show that law
proceeds not from will but from reason.”58 The legal treatise genre
embodied this scientific turn, for “through its ‘black letter’ presentation of
supposed ‘general principles’ of law it sought to suppress all controversy
over policy while promoting the comforting ideal of a logical, symmetrical,
and most important, inexorable system of law.”59
Thus, as a new constellation of class-embodied economic interests
politically succeeded in using blatant instrumentalist approaches to force
law into mirroring and promoting their preferences, the time subsequently
arrived to enshrine those gains. Accordingly, at that time legal actors and
the ruling economic classes strategically shifted “from an instrumental to a
formalist legal consciousness.”60 Legal consciousness is therefore clearly
important—”it is primarily with its underlying legal consciousness that [ . . .
it is] concerned”61—to this critical legal narrative, as it facilitates an
opportunistic marriage between “the rise in the power of the . . . legal
profession” and “the newly powerful commercial and entrepreneurial
interests [ . . . and their] wish for the first time to ‘freeze’ legal doctrine and
to conceive of law not as a malleable instrument of their own desires and
interests but as a fixed and inexorable system of logically deducible rules.”62
Legal formalism is thus the intellectual place where all these factors
converge, but it is epiphenomenal rather than “underlying.”
Consider a second master narrative about roughly the same period of
United States law, only now one that sets legal consciousness as
predominant over material forces and, correctly, rejects the view of
formalism as an “aberrational interlude” between instrumentalist
approaches to law. The grand narrative plot here is a transition in the
structure of legal consciousness from its “pre-classical” to its “classical,”
nineteenth century formal-integrative version of “a rationalistic ordering of
the whole legal universe.”63 The subtype of legal consciousness named
“classical legal thought” is presented as having two main characteristics.
The first is the view—sincerely or insincerely held by legal actors—that
“abstract propositions” are operative. I understand “operative” here to mean
that despite their abstractness, propositions allow actors, if not to motivate,
57. Id. at 263.
58. Id. at 258.
59. Id. at 258.
60. Id. at 261.
61. Id. at 258.
62. Id. at 258-259.
63. DUNCAN KENNEDY, THE RISE AND FALL OF CLASSICAL LEGAL THOUGHT 7 (2006). Dated 1975,
therefore preceding the publication of THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, the original
manuscript of THERISE AND FALL received a revised Chapter 1 that post-dates the former.
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at least to justify legal choices and case decisions. The second characteristic
is the subsumption of formal sources of law under the abstraction of a
“power absolute within its judicially delineated sphere.”64 Classical legal
thought led legal actors—again, especially judges and treatise authors—to
“experience . . . the compulsion by which an abstraction dictates,
objectively, apolitically, in a nondiscretionary fashion, a particular result.”65
Unlike the previous materialist historical explanation of the rise of
formalism, which emphasized the structuring effect of economic forces
upon legal consciousness, this second, ideational (cum incipient systems
theory) explanation, focuses on the structuring effect of legal consciousness
upon legal praxis.66 Despite these differences, the two accounts share a
general thesis about the turn to legal science: “[f]or a crucial season, that of
the transformation of American economic and social life, the thinking of the
legal elite was organized neither around the categories of natural right and
utilitarianism, nor in the vaguely instrumentalist or nationalist mode. . . .
During this period, treatise writers, leaders of the bar, Supreme Court
Justices, and the like shared a conception of law that appeared to transcend
the old conflicting schools, and to ally the profession with science against
both philosophical speculation and the crudities of democratic politics.”67
The relative causal relevance given in this second narrative to legal
consciousness gives it an overall explanatory enhancement. The attribution
to legal consciousness—”the study of the characteristics of [which] holds
the key to a large number of the most puzzling aspects of the intellectual
history of law”68—of relative ontological and causal autonomy “as a
mediator of the contradictions of experience”69 opens up to comprehension
“the dilemmas of modern legal and political theory,” which can only be
understood “if we recognize and confront the existence of legal
consciousness as an entity with a measure of autonomy. It is a set of
concepts and intellectual operations that evolves according to a pattern of
its own, and exercises an influence on results distinguishable from those of
political power and economic interest.” However, “the autonomy of legal
consciousness . . . is no more than relative . . . [for] the particular concepts
and operations characteristic of a period, but also the entity that they
64. Id. at 31.
65. Id. at 31.
66. Giambattista Vico taught how consciousness types—poetic, heroic and age-of-men languages, in
his terminology —generate the accompanying type of jurisprudence suitable to their presiding
archetypes. GIAMBATTISTAVICO, THE FIRSTNEW SCIENCE (Leon Pompa ed. & trans., 2002). His work
is yet to receive among contemporary legal theorists and historians the attention it merits.
67. Id. at 7.
68. Id. at 10.
69. Id. at 249. Where “[t]he sense of contradiction arises from the persistent existence within
consciousness of elements which seem mutually exclusive. These can be inconsistent facts, conflicting
emotions, or operative abstractions whose implication contradict one another. Mediation is the reduction
of the sense of contradiction by an arrangement of the elements that makes the problem less salient.” Id.
at 34.
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together constitute, are intelligible only in terms of the larger structures of
social thought and action.”70 In other words, what tempers the weight given
to legal consciousness is not an accommodation of materialism, but rather
ascendance on the structural-ideational ladder.71
The explanatory preeminence of legal consciousness offers greater
understanding of the flow of influence in the dyad law and society. The
introduction of legal consciousness as “a third tier between interest or power
and outcomes . . . makes it possible to learn things about our present
situation which were obscured by the simpler vision of an unmediated
interplay of purposes and outcomes”72 such as that of the previous example
of grand legal history. The resulting historical insight is compelling, and the
saga of ideas that grounds it deserves this lengthy quotation:
[T]his is what happened: Before the Civil War, the legal elite
conceived the set of legal relationships that together comprise the
American legal system—i.e., private citizen to private citizen, private
citizen to state, legislature to judiciary, and federal to state
government—as qualitatively distinct from one another and as
operated legally according to qualitatively distinct analytic
principles—i.e., the common law, sovereignty limited by written
constitutions, the equilibrium of forces between separate governmental
powers, the union of sovereign states.
During the Classical period, the legal elite conceived these four
institutional relationships as four particular instances of a single
general legal relation: each of them was an example of the delegation
of legal powers absolute within their spheres. The role of the judiciary
(its sphere of absolute power) was the application of a single,
distinctively legal, analytic apparatus to the job of policing the
boundaries of these spheres. The legal system appeared to have
synthesized successfully the positivist science of law, natural rights
constitutionalism, and Classical Economics.
After 1900, this highly-integrated system began a process of further
integration that tended toward the reduction of all legal action to the
enforcement of intrinsically just ground rules for economic struggle
among private actors. The refinements were a response to attacks by
liberals and progressives on the political role of the judiciary, but
proved ultimately self-destructive. The triumph of a purely formal
theory of marginal utility in economics and the appearance of
American philosophical pragmatism undermined the analytic
apparatus, leading to the dissipation of faith in the intrinsic justice of
70. Id. at 8.
71. Across gulfs of style, intellectual references and ideological alignment, Kennedy’s history of the
emergence of classical legal thought finds kinship in a work such as FRANZWIEACKER, A HISTORY OF
PRIVATE LAW IN EUROPE (Tony Weir trans., 1995).
72. Id. at 8.
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the rules, and discrediting the notion that they could be objectively
developed or applied. The outcome was a disintegration of legal
thought into mutually autonomous subcategories different from but
somewhat resembling those of the pre-Civil War period, and the
recession of the judiciary from the role of guardian of the integrity of
fundamental legal relationships.
The rise and fall of Classical legal thought was an integral, necessary
event in the current of development within which we live. I reject the
conception of “formalism” as an aberrational interlude, marring what
would otherwise be a uniform and consistent approach sometimes
vaguely denominated “instrumentalism” equally characteristic of the
pre-Civil War and post-1937 periods.73
Driving legal actors is, therefore, a consciousness that forges belief in the
capacity of reason to sufficiently step out of the political and economic fray
in order to access an integrative concept of justice and its attending
requirements according to a logic of “wills” sovereign within their
respective domains and yet null outside of it.74 Guarding the boundaries of
those domains, ready to act in face of usurpations, was the judge as the
protagonist legal actor.
But how, then, is legal consciousness defined? In two ways: according to
content and to function. The content-based definition delineates both the
cognitive space to be populated with concepts as well as the kinds of
concepts that belong within it. It goes like this:
Consciousness refers to the total contents of a mind, including images
of the external world, images of the self, of emotions, goals and values,
and theories about the world and self. I use the term only in this vague,
all-inclusive sense. It defines the universe within which are situated the
more sharply-delineated concepts that are the vehicles for analysis. . . .
Legal Consciousness is an only slightly more defined notion. It refers
to the particular form of consciousness that characterizes the legal
profession as a social group, at a particular moment. The main
peculiarity of this consciousness is that it contains a vast number of
legal rules, arguments, and theories, a great deal of information about
the institutional workings of the legal process, and the constellation of
ideals and goals current in the profession at a given moment.75
The functional definition redefines legal consciousness as a system of
premises about law and its historical background. Subsets of those premises
often interconnect, creating subsystems. This system and its subsystems
operate as a shared background condition of personal opinion formation and
action orientation, and of interpersonal intelligibility so that “people can
73. Id. at 8-9.
74. Id. at 10.
75. Id. at 33.
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have in common something more influential than a checklist of facts,
techniques, and opinions.” The operational efficacy of legal consciousness
is explained in part by the fact that it is “so basic that actors rarely if ever
bring [its constituting premises] consciously to mind.”76
In this ideational ecosystem, the subsystems of legal thought vie for
hegemony. Left concededly “vague” in this account is what causes the
subsystem that eventually congealed as “classical legal thought” to prevail
over competing subsystems in replacing “pre-classical” legal
consciousness. Offered instead is a description of the general features of
legal ideas—which by definition were already internal to legal
consciousness—as they come into contact with one another. “Then,
abruptly or gradually, a distinct, qualitatively new process took hold of
them: they were drawn into the integrating subsystem of Classicism. In the
process, they changed. In the process of causing those changes in the parts,
the integrating subsystem went through its own transformation of internal
structure, a tightening in the mode of interrelatedness,” thus “the subsystem
evolved as a whole.” 77 An incipient systems theory (the system and
environment framework) reemerges in the narrative to reinforce the point
that the dynamic of ideas within legal consciousness “changed
autonomously from, although in response to, what happened outside of
it. . . . We can identify, and follow through time, clusters of ideas that are
entities. They develop, evolve, transform themselves, but are nonetheless
somehow ‘the same thing,’ as opposed to other entities, that they were at
the beginning.” The historical process of legal consciousness is “thus cast
in organic terms.”78
These two grand revisionist narratives successfully used synchronic and
diachronic enclosed legal explanations as historical materials for their
enclosing-diachronic explanations. In the process, they transformed the
interpretation of the United States law in the nineteenth century. The first
account, materialist, offered a wide-ranging and yet nuanced and detailed
interpretation of economic change driving political change driving
normative change. Its explanatory limitations are coextensive with those of
materialism, even before the issue of whether it was informed by a general
theory of the nature of law and its evolution arises.
As for the second narrative, the 1960s-1980s witnessed the revival of the
nineteenth century concern with identifying and clarifying the conscious
and unconscious implicit in and of social practice as an essential component
of social explanation, and some of that concern was absorbed by
historiography. Our second account, ideational,79 is one of the most
76. Id. at 11.
77. Id. at 32-33.
78. Id. at 32-33.
79. An account that fits well in a long ideationalist tradition in Anglo-American social sciences and
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penetrating, revealing, and original efforts of that revival.80 Its greater
explanatory power, relative to first account, is a beneficiary of the more
precise way it uses and connects concepts and of its consequentially richer
structuralism (structuralism as traditionally defined).
In terms of legal explanation, though, it is not enough to describe legal
consciousness as the depository of all things legal, with things-legal being
circularly defined as those materials which legal professionals deposit in
their professional minds, and then to postulate the contextualism of the
materials thus deposited that congeal in certain ways because of forces
internal and external to the activity of professionals, or the logic of the
materials they think and talk about, or some exogenous influence, all of
which are left unweighted and underspecified.
What defines a legal actor? Are legal actors the same as legal
professionals? What conceptual structures allow the selectivity of materials
that will be deemed legal by legal actors? Do conceptual structures pre-
determine what legal actors will download into their minds? If so, do
conceptual structures determine the content of legal consciousness (in
historiography as exemplified by J. S. Mill and Quentin Skinner. Mill wrote: “the evidence of history
and that of human nature combine, by a striking instance of consilience, to show that there really is one
social element which is thus predominant, and almost paramount, among the agents of the social
progression. This is, the state of the speculative faculties of mankind; including the nature of the beliefs
which by any means they have arrived at, concerning themselves and the world by which they are
surrounded.” J.S. MILL, A SYSTEM OF LOGIC 641 (1904). Skinner illustrates the point with a sixteenth-
century example: “The merchant cannot hope to describe any action he may choose to perform as being
‘religious’ in character, but only those which can be claimed with some show of plausibility to meet
such agreed criteria as there may be for the application of the term. It follows that if he is anxious to
have his conduct appraised as that of a genuinely religious man, he will find himself restricted to the
performance of only a certain range of actions. Thus the problem facing the merchant who wishes to be
seen as pious rather than self-interested cannot simply be the instrumental one of tailoring his account
of his principles in order to fit his projects; it must in part be the problem of tailoring his projects in
order to make them answer to the pre-existing language of moral principles.” Concluding that: “The
story of the merchant suggests two morals. One is that it must be a mistake to portray the relationship
between our social vocabulary and our social world as a purely external and contingent one. It is true
that our social practices help to bestow meaning on our social vocabulary. But it is equally true that our
social vocabulary helps to constitute the character of those practices. To see the role of our evaluative
language in helping to legitimate social action is to see the point at which our social vocabulary and our
social fabric mutually prop each other up. . . . The other moral is that, if there are indeed causal linkages
between social language and social reality, to speak of the one as mirroring the other may be to envisage
the causal arrows pointing in the wrong direction. As the example of the Elizabethan merchant suggests,
to recover the nature of the normative vocabulary available to an agent for the description and appraisal
of his conduct is at the same time to indicate one of the constraints on his conduct itself. This in turn
suggests that, if we wish to explain why our merchant chose to concentrate on certain courses of action
while avoiding others, we are bound to make some reference to the prevailing moral language of the
society in which he was acting. For this, it now appears, must have figured not as an epiphenomenon of
his projects, but as one of the determinants of his actions.” Quentin Skinner, Language and Political
Change, in POLITICAL INNOVATION AND CONCEPTUAL CHANGE 6, 21-22 (T. Ball, J. Farr, & R.L.
Hanson, eds., 1989).
80. To mention just a few: the notions of “paradigm” in THOMASKUHN, THESTRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC
REVOLUTIONS (1962), of “episteme” in MICHEL FOUCAULT, LES MOTS ET LES CHOSES—UNE
ARCHEOLOGIE DES SCIENCES HUMAINES (1966), of “habitus” in PIERRE BOURDIEU, ESQUISSE D’UNE
THEORIE DE LA PRATIQUE PRECEDE DE TROIS ETUDES D’ETHNOLOGIE KABYLE (1972), and of
“formative contexts” in ROBERTO MANGABEIRA UNGER, FALSE NECESSITY: ANTI-NECESSITARIAN
SOCIAL THEORY IN THE SERVICE OF RADICALDEMOCRACY (1987).
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which case the legal consciousness of classical legal thought was a creation
of the cognitive formalism of legal science)? If it is the other way around,
then we are back to needing an explanation of what determines the
selectivity of what constitutes legal materials in the mind of legal actors. If
concepts come first, what originated or what warrants the particular
conceptual structure that gave rise to “classical legal thought?” What are
the keystones of that conceptual structure? What forces operate within the
conceptual structure, and in which directions do those forces push so that
we can speak of relative autonomy of the legal consciousness that it forges?
What forces operate outside the conceptual structure, and in which
directions do those forces push? What creates the conceptual structure and
the forms of practice it renders intellectually intelligible, or the practically
productive, relatively autonomous system vis-à-vis those forces? What
about the conceptual structure makes it autonomous, and what about it
makes that autonomy relative? What types of legal analyses or explanations
does the conceptual structure afford? How do they relate to each other?
What is the ontology of the object of the conceptual structure of law? How,
when only intelligible through and as a conceptual structure, do legal
systems mediate between functional adaptation and axiological steering to
achieve both efficiency and legitimacy? What paradigm of legal thought
makes possible the adoption of a conceptual structure for law?What are the
main tenets of that paradigm? How do legal actors, from the point of view
of thought and action, internalize the paradigm and perform it in the world?
Do social actors in general need to internalize, or buy into, the paradigm in
order for the law of complex societies to generate stability as change or is
it sufficient that legal actors, however defined, do so? If so, why do they?
And how? And once they do internalize the legal paradigm, how is that
manifested in social stability as change?
A general theory of the nature of law and its evolution might place the
legal historian closer to answering these questions, thus catapulting the
explanatory power of grand legal history. Only then it may turn out that to
contend that “[t]he main peculiarity of [legal] consciousness is that it
contains a vast number of legal rules, arguments, and theories, a great deal
of information about the institutional workings of the legal process, and the
constellation of ideals and goals current in the profession at a given
moment”81 is not inconsistent with the other contention that legal
consciousness is “so basic that actors rarely if ever bring [its constituting
premises] consciously to mind.”82 And the grand narrative will be able to
show why that is the case.
In sum, the benefit of having these two remarkable contributions to
historiography before us confirms that grand legal history is burdened by
81. KENNEDY, supra note 63, at 33.
82. Id. at 11.
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the fact that its explanatory powers track its accoupling of itself to a rigorous
and generative theoretical description of the nature and evolution of law.
Without this kind of support, what grounding is there to address the
challenge of conceivable incommensurability83 that may arise between
competing (e.g., one materialist and another ideational) grand historical
narratives?
My contention, again, is that without the parameters afforded by a theory
of the nature and evolution of law, grand historical narratives lack sufficient
internal resources to ground their explanatory projects, and therefore any
historical revisionism to which they aspire. But once brought to the bar of
such a theory, the commensurability presupposed by both critique and
revisionism becomes possible,84 for a theory of the nature and evolution of
law allows historiographical commensurability in virtue of the parameters
it provides for judgment of comparative narrative superiority. The
assumption here is that, to borrow from MacIntyre’s helpful formulation, a
historical narrative is superior to a preceding one “if and only if the
former . . . enables us to give an adequate and by the best standards we have
a true explanation of why the [inferior historical narrative] both enjoyed the
successes and victories that it did and suffered the defeats and frustrations
that it did.”85 This ability is what is afforded by jurisprudence to legal
history.
To generalize the point made above: calls for global, deep or long-term
history presuppose the possibility of progress in historical understanding.
That progress in turn presupposes a higher order enclosing-diachronic
theory of their subject matter, because how else do we tell progress from
regress without falling back into justifications by intuition, experience or
convention?
83. In the terms specified by KUHN, supra note 80.
84. The contention here is much more robust than Habermas’ suggestion that “an evolutionary theory
would, after all, be able to ‘inspire’ history writing.” Jürgen Habermas, History and Evolution, in TELOS
39, 43 (D.J. Parent trans., 1979). Note, on the other hand, that I do not call for a stealth conflation in the
form of a “reconciliation” of historiography and general theories of the nature and evolution of law,
such as Unger understandably does in the context of approaching core questions of social theory via the
method of comparative-historical analysis—”I take seriously the need to work toward a reconciliation
of generalizing theory and historiography.” UNGER, supra note 5, at 45. See also supra note 78.
85. Alasdair MacIntyre, The Relationship of Philosophy to Its Past, in PHILOSOPHY INHISTORY: ESSAYS
IN THE HISTORIOGRAPHY OF PHILOSOPHY 31, 43 (Richard Rorty, J.B. Schneewind & Quentin Skinner
eds., 1984). Bernard Williams offers a similar formulation, of what he names “vindicatory” explanation,
but restricts it to the progress of science, and decrees it inapplicable to the succession of explanations in
philosophy: “There is of course a real question of what it is for a history to be a history of discovery.
One condition of its being so lies in a familiar idea, which I would put like this: the later theory, or (more
generally) outlook, makes sense of itself, and of the earlier outlook, and of the transition from the earlier
to the later, in such terms that both parties (the holders of the earlier outlook, and the holders of the later)
have reason to recognize the transition as an improvement. . . . But in the geographically extended and
long-lasting and various process by which the old political and ethical order has changed into modernity,
while it was propelled by many crises, they were not in the first instance crises of explanation. They
were crises of confidence or of legitimacy, and the story of how one conception rather than another came
to provide the basis of a new legitimacy is not on the face of it vindicatory.” Bernard Williams,
Philosophy as a Humanistic Discipline, 75 PHILOSOPHY 477, 487-488 (2000).
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Furthermore, only the contention that neither convention nor personal
intuition or self-reported experience suffice as benchmark for
commensurability meets the requirements of critical historiography.
Critical thought86 does not earn its title solely by espousal of theses that
contravene the status quo or opinion consensus, or by employing alternative
methods of inquiry, or by adopting an intellectual performance that
prevailing consensus deems critical, or by being “woke.” Critique starts
with interrogation of one’s reliance on intuition, experience, convention
(cognitive, semantic, moral, etc.), or other mechanisms of self-
convincement.87 And that for a good reason, for meager as it may seem,
critical rigor offers the only hope of sufficiently escaping distorting
influences upon one’s thinking, and to the extent that escaping is not an
option, of knowing that that is the case and why. Absent that,
historiographical revisionism is in the opposite, albeit not less lost,
predicament of Montaigne’s seaman: any wind is right for a seaman who
never intended to leave his sheltered harbor.88
To be clear, I call for no point in the future of high thought in which grand
legal history, on one side, and theories that connect the nature of law to its
evolution, on the other, would merge. Nevertheless, the urge for grand legal
history to resort to theory is likely to be resisted. And some of that resistance
is well-founded,89 for the danger of colonization of legal history by
evolutionary theories of law is real. The enclosing-diachronic retrospective
narrative of grand legal history would in that case collapse under the weight
of the explanatory demands of its sibling, enclosing-diachronic
evolutionary theory.
Similarly, the balance would be negative, were legal history to be
subjected to the disciplinary consensus and methodological requirements
86. Critical, in other words, in one of the modern traditions of cognitive, normative or praxis critique
from Rousseau and Kant through Hegel, J. S. Mill, Marx, Nietzsche and Freud to de Beauvoir, Foucault,
Habermas and Rawls.
87. “How was it not a problem for us that we did not critique our own set of assumptions . . . ? How
could it not be the case that we two owned and suppressed a set of debatable groundings . . . ? John
Henry Schlegel, Sez Who? Critical Legal History without a Privileged Position, in THE OXFORD
HANDBOOK OF LEGAL HISTORY 561, 562 (Markus D. Dubber & Christopher Tomlins eds., 2018).
Writing on Foucault, Habermas, quoting Nancy Fraser, asks “Why is struggle preferred to submission?
Why ought domination to be resisted?” The implications of his genealogy force Foucault to beg the
question about the normative basis of social criticism. But as he begs the question, the modern
humanistic normative paradigm makes a covert re-entry onto the stage: “if one tries to glean the
standards implicitly appealed to in his indictments of disciplinary power, one encounters familiar
determinations from the normativistic language games that he has explicitly rejected.” Jürgen Habermas,
Some Questions Concerning the Theory of Power: Foucault Again, in CRITIQUE AND POWER:
RECASTING THE FOUCAULT/HABERMASDEBATE 79, 96 (Michael Kelly ed., 1994).
88. “No wind is right for a seaman who has no predetermined harbor.” MICHEL DEMONTAIGNE, THE
COMPLETE ESSAYS 379 (M.A. Screech trans., Penguin Books 1991).
89. One such example of resistance, in this case from a modernist culturalist position, which declines
the call to align history with jurisprudence (or with a “pragmatic” cashing out of history’s lessons) is
found in Nathaniel Berman, Modernism, Nationalism, and the Rhetoric of Reconstruction, 4 YALE J. L.
& HUMAN. 2 (1992).
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prevalent in comparative-historical analysis.90 The textured, nuanced, and
methodologically open rather than occluded character of the best historical
narrative is not to be lost or disciplined. It is to be unleashed. The argument
in this Article is one way of doing that.
II. THEORY OF THENATURE AND EVOLUTION OF LAW
This Section outlines a theory of the nature and evolution of law with a
focus on what is most germane to grand legal history. First, it addresses two
aspects of the theory of law: the role of law in the ascent of human history
from natural history as well as law’s irreducible will-history-reason triadic
nature. It then lays out the elementary structure91 of the evolution of law in
high-complexity societies. When combined, the evolutionary schema has
three concatenate parts: theory, structure, and paradigm.
To reiterate, the explanandum of a theory of the nature and evolution of
law is how high complexity societies achieve—when they do—social
stability as constant social adaptation and axiological responsiveness
through small quotidian and large occasional normative changes in what is
a system of law. Without understanding of this background, grand legal
history proceeds at its own explanatory peril, for to understand that
background is to discern the phenomenon of law in time.
A. Theory
Historians operate under both explicit and implicit assumptions about the
differentiation of human history from natural history. They also either
explicitly or implicitly favor macro-structural or micro-individualistic
ontological and causal models in their narrative construction. Regardless, a
90. Grand historical narratives share in comparative-historical analyses’ interest in macroconfigurational
orientation, proof driven case-based research, and temporally oriented analysis. Nonetheless, history is
not, and should not be, judged on the scientific truth of its discoveries. See, on comparative-historical
analyses, the interventions collected here: ADVANCES INCOMPARATIVE-HISTORICALANALYSIS (James
Mahoney & Kathleen Thelen eds., 2015); and here: COMPARATIVE HISTORICAL ANALYSIS IN THE
SOCIAL SCIENCES (James Mahoney & Dietrich Rueschemeyer eds., 2003). Twentieth century classics
of comparative-historical analyses include UNGER, supra note 5; BARRINGTON MOORE, SOCIAL
ORIGINS OF DICTATORSHIP AND DEMOCRACY (1993); and THEDA SKOCPOL, STATES AND SOCIAL
REVOLUTIONS (1979).
91. Positions on matters of social ontology and causation inform, of course, the notion of “structure” as
used in this Article. Here, however, is not the place to explain how so. I say only that my use of
“structures” takes into account but differs from the traditional structuralism of the Saussure and Levi-
Strauss tradition. For example, I am not committed to the thesis that identity is not intrinsic, but is rather
determined by the whole to which an element is a part. For a contrast, compare the use of “structure” in
this Article with Justin Desautels-Stein’s, Structuralist and Post-structuralist Legal History, in THE
OXFORD HANDBOOK OF LEGAL HISTORY, 549-559 (M. D. Dubber and C. Tomlins eds., 2018)
especially. Other helpful interlocutors on the nature of structures include Sally Haslanger, What is a
(Social) Structural Explanation?, 173 Phil. Stud. 1 (2016); FRED DREDSKE, EXPLAINING BEHAVIOR:
REASONS IN A WORLD OF CAUSES (1991); Frank Jackson & Philip Pettit, Structural Explanation in
Social Theory, in REDUCTION, EXPLANATION, ANDREALISM (D. Charles & K. Lennon eds., 1992); and
a reconstruction of a legal theory classic in Akbar Rasulov, From Apology to Utopia and the Inner Life
of International Law, 29 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 3 (2016).
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helpful schema on the nature and evolution of law must reflect the
differentiation between natural and human history while being compatible
with structural and individualistic ontologies and causalities. Its objective
is to assist legal history in making explicit that which is implicit and
obscured, as well as making that which is merely explicit to be so in a
reflectively coherent way.
We must start with a question addressed to the first condition of
possibility of legal history: why is there any history other than natural
history? Why not simply conflate human history with the natural history of
Homo Sapiens? In other words, what events lead to the ascent of human
history from natural history, such that no account of natural processes is
able fully to explain societies?What evolutionary process sparked the initial
and thenceforth cumulative differentiation of humanity from the rest of
nature? In the sequence, this Subsection discusses ontological and
methodological implications of classical answers to this threshold
evolutionary question.
Consider the following reconstruction of Hegel’s answer to the question
of natural/human historical differentiation. From a natural world that is
undifferentiated by reason, there emerges consciousness. Thence, the
phenomenology of consciousness unfolds (hence its historicity) socially
(hence its intersubjective development) toward ever purer conceptualism.
This continues until the apex of purely conceptual knowledge in which
“[t]his last shape of spirit is that of absolute knowing, the spirit which at the
same time gives to its complete and true content the form of self, and as a
result realizes its concept as well as remaining within its concept in this
realization. It is spirit knowing itself in the shape of spirit, or it is
comprehending conceptual knowing.”92 Human differentiation from
reason-undifferentiated nature is, however, never absolute, for the same
nature (broadly conceived) that served as a foil for the development of
conceptual capabilities continues to be the stage for the actualization of self-
consciousness. Only now—self-conscious of its appropriation of the world
as concepts and conscious of itself as a knower through concepts—reason
remains differentiated from nature, for it remains one with itself vis-à-vis
the rest of nature. In simpler terms, what humanizes the species is the
evolutionary acquisition of self-conscious, reflective conceptual
capabilities thenceforth irreducible to natural adaptive sensorial and
behavioral abilities.
Now consider the core of Marx’s answer, developed in the context of his
articulation of a philosophy of praxis against Hegel’s idealism. In that
philosophy, human productive practice is labor. Labor—the activity of
purposeful transformation of nature according to ideas and needs—begot
92. G. W. F. HEGEL, THE PHENOMENOLOGY OF SPIRIT, 427 (Terry Pinkard ed. & trans., Cambridge
Univ. Press 2018) (1807) (italics omitted).
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human history from the general background of natural history. The
speculation here is that through laboring activity, “man not only effects a
change of form in the materials of nature; he also realizes his own purposes
in those materials.”93 Hence, as purposeful expression of human ideas and
needs, the material product of primitive labor appears in the world as
tangible manifestations of the otherwise opaque and inaccessible contents
of consciousness. It is the cumulative and collective process of interposing
the product of labor as a buffer between everyday human life and
immaculate nature that humanizes the species and creates a social, human
world. The products of labor raise a ubiquitous mirror that allows the
species to see and become conscious of itself in the artifacts it produces.
Hence, all else in social life springs from labor. Consequently, according to
Marx, the different epochal modes of labor organization shaped the
humanization of the species, and consequently the types of consciousness
of each epoch.
Durkheim, in contrast, attributes the humanization of the species to the
primitive emergence and posterior transformations of collective
consciousness. These factors caused each individual to carry a personal
consciousness and partake in a collective one—a phenomenon Durkheim
referred to as “the double.”94 Before the double, each individual mind had
only instinctual relationships with the self and the environment, which
included other members of the group. In the process of evolution, a sense
of group identity and belonging developed in the minds of group
members—perhaps, Durkheim speculates, from primitive experiences of
“collective effervescence”—so that “just as society consecrates men, so it
also consecrates things, including ideas.” The sense of group identity and
belonging lies at the root of the humanization of the species, guiding the
evolution of not only social life, but also of human cognition, including the
categories of time, space and causation that Kant had attributed to a priori
mind constitution. And given the social origin of these categories of
thought, “logical discipline is an aspect of social discipline.”95
For Weber, the aspects that set the species apart—and consequently
steered its evolution away from the rest of nature—was the earned ability
to create and seek meaning. Meaning was to be imposed inclusively on the
scientific apprehension of nature. The disposition to ascribe meaning
accumulated as culture, which installed in the mind the lens through which
to perceive, process, and find action orientation in the world of natural and
social phenomena. Except for references to copingmechanisms of primitive
93. KARLMARX, CAPITAL 284 (B. Fowkes trans., Vintage Books 1977) (1867).
94. EMILE DURKHEIM, THE DIVISION OF LABOR IN SOCIETY (W.D. Halls trans., The Free Press 1997)
(1897).
95. EMILE DURKHEIM, THE ELEMENTARY FORMS OF RELIGIOUS LIFE, 215, 16 n.19 (K. Fields. trans.,
The Free Press 1995) (1912).
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minds confronted with phenomena they could not explain much less
control, Weber is frugal in his account of the beginnings of this process, but
his account of the centrality of meaning-seeking and meaning-giving to the
humanization of the species is potent.96
Undergirding these four models of natural history/human history
differentiation is their normative character. Each in its own way describes a
fundamental transformation, the expression of which is the subjection of
cognition and action to criteria of validity that are irreducible to natural
causality.
These classical hypotheses of humanization processes have further
ontological97 and methodological implications for a general theory of the
evolution of law. A concise articulation of these implications may be
presented in the form of a question: is social order the outcome (i) of top-
down structural or teleological constraints (such as conceptual schemata,
historical modes of labor organization or powerful forms of collective
consciousness) upon individual agency, (ii) of bottom-up aggregation of
individual practical and cognitive agency (of individuals maximizing
interests in terms of adaptive strategies and orienting action in terms of
meaning) that congeals as social order, or rather (iii) of some irreducible
dynamic between structure, teleology and agency?
Classical answers—including those by Hegel, Marx, Durkheim and
Weber—to this question also vary. On one end, there is the assertion that
social structures prevail over individual agency. This vision rests on two
basic assumptions: first, that agency is ultimately caused, constrained or
determined by its structural material (e.g. Marx) or ideational (e.g.
Durkheim) embedment; and, second, that the structural context of action is
the result of developments before which individual agency is helpless.
Answers of this kind claim that social causality at the micro-level of agency
can be fully explained by an appeal to the structures that envelop agents.
The opposite end emphasizes agency over structure. The basic
assumption of answers of this kind is also twofold. First, structural features
of the social world are said to be the aggregate outcome or congealment of
individual agency (e.g. J. S. Mill). Second, individual behavior can be
explained by a combination of instrumental reasoning, preference
hierarchies, opinion, sensibilities, and ideals that are, to a large extent,
experienced as autonomously forged or adopted by each individual (e.g. in
Mill and Weber). Now it is agency that lies sufficiently beyond the causal
control of structures, which, on the contrary, are themselves no more nor
less than the densest point of a complex net of individual acts converging
96. See, e.g., MAXWEBER, THE PROTESTANT ETHIC AND THE SPIRIT OF CAPITALISM (Talcott Parsons
trans., Routledge, 2001).
97. This Article is not the place to clarify the concept of ontology used in it. Helpful analysis of the
concept is developed in Brian Epstein, A Framework for Social Ontology, 46 PHIL. SOC. SCI. 2 (2016).
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over time. Accordingly, structures are best explained as the outcome of the
pattern-creating encounter of a multitude of sufficiently self-determined
individual acts.
What these two antipodes have in common is the “subjective” (in the
precise sense explained below) focus of their explanations of social
ontology. What individuals think and do is either the product of self-
generated mental processes or of the subjectively experienced influence of
the structures they inhabit. Accordingly, any intersubjectivity has to take
one of two limited forms: it is either the consideration by individuals in their
strategizing of the imagined strategizing of others (as in Hobbes) to the
extent that they are relevant to fulfilling a given preference of the former or
the intersubjectivity is mediated by the structures they share.
Against the dyad of agency and structure, the past decades witnessed the
reemergence98 of the “intersubjective” in the explanation of social
ontology.99 Common to intersubjective theories of society is the contention
that both social structure and individual agency are aspects of the overall
ontology of the social that is created through the communicative interaction
and meaning-construction of relevant social agents. Consequently, in an
ontologically irreducible way, social structure and individual agency are
constituted intersubjectively. One consequence of this intersubjectivity turn
in social ontology comes in the form of an epistemological thesis:
explanatory capabilities are proportional to success in spelling out the
generative role of the “intersubjective” in social reality.
Historians will, by now, have easily mapped the schools of historiography
and their controversies onto the problematics of natural history/human
history differentiation and of downward (from structures to individuals),
upward (from individuals to structures) or intersubjective social
explanatory models. But we are now also better positioned to understand
how the different pieces of a schema on the nature and evolution of law are
historiographically generative.
98. Nineteenth century idealism, from Hegel on, already sought to overcome the subjectivism they
deemed excessive or one-sided.
99. See, among many works that span the decades and in addition to relevant references already cited,
PETER L. BERGER & THOMAS LUCKMANN, THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF REALITY (1967); JOHN
SEARLE, THE CONSTRUCTION OF SOCIAL REALITY (1995) and JOHN SEARLE, MAKING THE SOCIAL
WORLD (2010); and BRIAN EPSTEIN, THE ANT TRAP: REBUILDING THE FOUNDATIONS OF THE SOCIAL
SCIENCES (2015). Habermas conceives this intersubjectivity in terms of communicative action: “the
communicative model of action does not equate action with communication. Language is a medium of
communication that serves understanding, whereas actors, in coming to an understanding with one
another so as to coordinate their actions, pursue their particular aims. In this respect the teleological
structure is fundamental to all concepts of action. Concepts of social action are distinguished, however,
according to how they specify the coordination among the goal-directed actions of different
participants. . . . In the case of communicative action the interpretive accomplishments on which
cooperative processes of interpretation are based represent the mechanism for coordinating action;
communicative action is not exhausted by the act of reaching understanding in an interpretive
manner. . . . But communicative action designates a type of interaction that is coordinated through
speech acts and does not coincide with them.” HABERMAS, supra note 36, at 101.
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With the above in mind, reconsider now two aspects of the nature of law
which understanding is central to legal history.
The first aspect is that law embodies the decoupling of human history
from natural history. It does so because normativity, as explained above, is
the unifying element in the most promising theories of natural/human
historical differentiation. Also, recall that law is normativity
institutionalized. In the distant past, law was constitutive and a principal
mode of manifestation of major normative practices, from kinship and
religion, to trade, social hierarchy, and power. In modern times, law has
intensified its role in constituting and shaping normative practices. For
example, law constitutes and regulates fundamental epistemic, cultural,
political, linguistic, and institutional preconditions of contemporary
politics, family, art, violence, intimacy, connectivity, science, technology,
and the economy.
Whatever understanding of human affairs is afforded by legal history, its
potency depends on how explicitly it incorporates the phenomenology of
law as a universal, evolving system of intersubjective normative
constitution of society that perpetuates the ascent of human history from
natural history. In high-complexity societies, recall, this evolving system
makes possible the achievement of social stability as constant social
adaptation and axiological responsiveness through small quotidian and
large occasional normative changes.
Let us now turn to the second aspect of the nature of law—the
understanding of which is perhaps the most urgent to legal history—that the
norms of a legal system come into existence by acts of individual or
collective will that mobilize, in different ways, history and reason.100
Operationally, law reaches out from the past into the future through the
present; past decisions constantly shape what the future ought to
approximate. Hence, law ontologically inhabits the tense intersection of
will, reason, and history, which underlie the tension between functional
adaptation and axiological aspiration.
In this framework, the concept of will refers to the political power and to
the legal authority that allow those who possess them to promulgate the
formal sources of law. Power and authority allow issuance of formal sources
of law because the subjective expression of preference on the part of their
holders is jusgenerative; that is, their preference is intersubjectively
interpreted as objective law, to adapt a Kelsenian formulation.101 Legal
systems of high-complexity societies have themselves assumed
100. This Subsection draws from Paulo Barrozo, The Great Alliance: History, Reason, and Will in
Modern Law, 78 LAW&CONTEMP. PROBS. 1 (2015).
101. The question of identification of sources of law in terms of sociological criteria of recognition or
of formal criteria of validity that animated positivistic debates during the last century are to be
understood in the context of the will aspect of the ontology of laws.
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(autopoietically) the regulation of this special meaning-attribution process.
In any event, in modern times, where ultimate jusgenerative power and
authority are traced back to popular consent, will refers first to the concrete,
if latent, constituent power of citizens and to their normative authority in
and over the structure of the modern state. In legal explanation, will is a
trope used to denote not only acts of legislative, judicial or executive law-
making, but also voting, deference to elections, public opinion, plebiscites
and referenda, evolving cultural standards, trends in legislative production
across subnational legislative bodies, social movements, current common
knowledge, and so on.
The concept of reason refers to instrumental reason (concerned with
means-end efficiency, consequences, expediency, costs and benefits),
cognitive reason (science, expertise), or normative reason (creation or
revelation of the truer meaning of values such as freedom, equality, justice,
and dignity). In legal explanation, reason is a trope used in arguments that
appeal to the faculty of reason or to reasonable outcomes to explain and
justify punctual legal choices as well as to chart or account for broader
directions in the development of law.
The concept of history refers to all dimensions of law’s diachronicity,
from the transtemporality of legal norms to the transgenerational nature of
will to the cumulative learning of problem-solving and axiology. It refers
also to historical events as they inform the development of the law such as
constitutional foundation lores, civil strife, civil or foreign wars, etc.History
refers further to historical tradition such as legal precedents or political–
moral traditions, and historical meaning such as pinpointing time and place
of utterances as criteria to ascertain meaning in doctrines of interpretative
canon (original intent, e. g.), etc. In legal explanation, history is a trope used
in appeals to the past to justify present legal choices or some extant part of
the overall legal order.
The triadic nature of law is irreducible. The lesson of the second aspect
of the nature of law for legal history is therefore that its narratives must be
capacious enough to include how each pillar of the triad as well as the
interaction between them bear upon macro-to-micro, micro-to-macro, or
intersubjective social explanations of the materials of legal history and the
resulting general picture which the historical narrative purports to convey.
B. Structure
With those two theoretical aspects of the nature of law in place, we now
turn to the structure of legal evolution in high-complexity societies.102 This
102. In addition to works elsewhere cited in this Article, the following were influential interlocutors in
the development of the outline of the evolutionary theory presented here: ANTHONY GIDDENS, THE
CONSTITUTION OF SOCIETY (1986); DAVID GARLAND, PUNISHMENT AND MODERN SOCIETY (1993);
ROBERTO MANGABEIRA UNGER, WHAT SHOULD LEGAL ANALYSIS BECOME? (1996); JURGEN
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Subsection identifies the principal elements of the structure in their static
roles before modeling them in their dynamic interaction.
Six structural elements stand out: paradigm, formal sources, institutions,
functional adaptive pressures, axiological orientation, and actors. Paradigm
receives special attention in the next Subsection. Formal sources refer to
what intersubjectively counts, on the basis of application of criteria of
identification themselves either already legally formalized or still at the
stage of political fact, as objective law in a legal system. These normally
include a combination of legislation, regulation, writing of intellectual
authorities, custom, and judicial precedent. In the legal systems of complex
societies, the formal sources of law are further conceptualized in terms of
criteria of systemic inclusion/exclusion of source candidates—for example
procedures established for the enactment of the particular source having
been followed and the source in question not substantively contravening the
content of a higher source in the system. Think here of legislative
procedures and judicial review. Importantly, the hierarchy of sources
combined with criteria of inclusion/exclusion allow the conceptual reductio
ad unum at any time of n-sources to the singularity of a legal system.
Law is the first institution, for it is generative or constitutive of all other
institutions. The derivate institutions of a legal system are myriad. Some are
part of the structure of a state or international organization, while others are
private or semi-private. The focus here is on the first, public type of legal
institution. One obvious but unattended facet of public institutions is that
they depend on legal thought—in all its four types of legal explanation
(Subsection 1.B)—for meaning, direction, and shared intelligibility in the
coordinated, collective activity of those institutions. With the nature of
society in mind, Durkheim wrote that “[it] is not constituted simply by the
mass of individuals who comprise it, the ground they occupy, the things
they use, or the movements they make, but above all by the idea it has of
itself.”103 This is equally true of the most important public institutions,
which even more so require (legal) thought to ground the idea they have of
themselves and to animate their operations. It is from the modes of legal
HABERMAS, BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS (William Rehg trans., MIT Press 1998); Duncan Kennedy,
Three Globalizations of Law and Legal Thought: 1850–2000, in THE NEW LAW AND ECONOMIC
DEVELOPMENT: A CRITICAL APPRAISAL (David Trubek & Alvaro Santos eds., 2006); CLAUDE LEVI-
STRAUSS, STRUCTURAL ANTHROPOLOGY (Claire Jacobson & Brook Grundfest Schoepf trans., Basic
Books 1963); ALAN WATSON, THE EVOLUTION OF LAW (1989); GUNTHER TEUBNER, LAW AS AN
AUTOPOIETIC SYSTEM (Anne Bankowska & Ruth M. Adler trans., Blackwell 1993); IMMANUELKANT,
Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Purpose, in KANT: POLITICALWRITINGS (H.B. Nisbet
trans., Cambridge Univ. Press 2d ed. 1991); ALEXIS TOCQUEVILLE, THE ANCIEN REGIME AND THE
FRENCH REVOLUTION (Arthur Goldhammer trans., Cambridge Univ. Press 2011); CHRIS TORNHILL, A
SOCIOLOGY OF CONSTITUTIONS: CONSTITUTIONS AND STATE LEGITIMACY IN HISTORICAL-
SOCIOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE (2013); and TALCOTT PARSONS, THE EVOLUTIONS OF SOCIETIES (1977),
as well as the additional writings collected in Part IV of TALCOTT PARSONS ON INSTITUTIONS AND
SOCIAL EVOLUTION (Leon H. Mayhew ed., Univ. of Chicago Press 1982).
103. DURKHEIM, supra note 95, at 425.
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explanation that those institutions derive and through which they distribute
what one author called the “deontic powers” of institutions.104 The upshot
is that the operation of the institutions of legal systems depends on legal
thought, and legal thought depends on the institutions of law to survive and
thrive. Hosting institutions and hosted legal thought shape each other.105
Dynamically, ever-expanding complexity creates unrelenting tail-wind
functional adaptive pressures. Unguided by values, responses to those
pressures would not stop. They would proceed in axiologically blind ways,
surrendering directionality to strategizing, or managerial, or merely
participatory, or experimentalist mechanisms. Things can go on for quite
some time like that, but the kind of stability as change that the legal systems
of high-complexity societies are capable of would not persist as long as it
has in some cases were it not for the admixture of values in the process of
adaptive responsiveness.
Returning to a point made earlier, legal systems are voracious, sucking in
and digesting not-yet-legal norms, expectations, modes of collective
organization, problem-solving strategies, customs, power-grabbing
strategies, concentrative and decentrative distributive plans, processes of
identity formation and dilution, spatial and temporal organization, etc. In
this process of permanent institutionalization, social stability as constant
social change takes on the form of law’s capacity to receive and process
functional adaptive pressures and axiological demands. The choices about
which functional adaptive pressures are selected, and how they are
responded to, generate social instability unless and until axiological
orientation sufficiently guides or constrains those choices. Those
considerations ground the contention that social stability as constant social
adaptation and axiological responsiveness is achieved through small
quotidian and large occasional normative changes.
Furthermore, at this late stage of legal evolution, the conceptual structure
of law is itself a source of axiological demands. Axiological orientation
comes into this picture as new values (or new conceptions of older values)
clash within existing legal fora. This process is inherent in the triadic will-
history-reason nature of law, which unleashes reflective106 pushes within
modes of legal explanation. Indeed, at any given point in time, the extant
norms of a legal system can be construed as manifestation of policies that
embody value choices. Thus, at any point in time, any area of legal
104. John Searle,What Is an Institution?, 1 J. INSTITUTIONAL ECON. 1, 1 (2005).
105. This is a point I make in detail in Paulo Barrozo, Institutional Conditions of Contemporary Legal
Thought, in SEARCHING FOR CONTEMPORARY LEGAL THOUGHT (Christopher Tomlins & Justin
Desautels-Stein eds., 2017).
106. There is not an opportunity here to digress on the concept of reflectivity. I have deployed the notion
of “reflective push” in Paulo Barrozo, Cruelty in Criminal Law: Four Conceptions, 51 CRIM. L. BULL.
5 (2015). In addition to the works by Kant and Hegel already mentioned, I direct the reader to
ALESSANDRO FERRARA, REFLECTIVE AUTHORITY: RETHINKING THE PROJECT OF MODERNITY (1998)
and to ULRICH BECK, ANTHONYGIDDENS& SCOTT LASH, REFLEXIVEMODERNIZATION (1994).
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regulation—e.g., health, education, energy, data, commerce,
communications, crime—can be construed as a values domain. This
explains the textured nature of domains—sometimes called “regimes”—of
regulation.107 Their texture—which explains the push for legal history to
consider context—is a function of the interaction of will, history, and
reason. The push of reflectivity can therefore operate from within any
domain even if not triggered by adaptive challenges. Its operation can in
turn lead to the perception or realization that the meaning and requirements
of the values of the respective regulatory area or regime are not yet
sufficiently understood and operative.108
The internal push of reflectivity is carried on by legal actors (either
directly or by mediating other social actors) pushing onward toward
dimensions of values and their requirements that escaped prevailing
conceptions at the starting point of the push.109 In doing so, they deploywill-
, history-, or reason-based arguments.
That is why we speak of tail-wind adaptive pressures and axiological
steering-edges only figuratively; as a matter of fact, they consist in action
by legal actors. In other words, legal actors are the ones who push and steer
within the system. As they do so, actors and the structures of a legal system
interact without being reducible to each other.110
When considered in their dynamism, legal systems are strained by both
adaptive and axiological pressures. The sufficiently successful mediation of
these pressures explains their ability to produce social stability through
continuous law-guided social change. This outcome is, again,
simultaneously a sociological and an ethical feat. It is fundamentally
important to understand that the mediation takes place in the minds of legal
actors, which thenceforth and therefrom manifests in the world.
107. Note that the evolutionary framework outlined in this Article is intentionally capacious enough to
accommodate accounts of change within areas of regulation. For example, in his master study of the
evolution of penal control, David Garland speaks of two kinds of “transformative forces” in operation:
“social, economic, and cultural” society-wide changes of late modernity and the “political realignments
and policy initiatives” developed in reaction to the former. DAVID GARLAND, THE CULTURE OF
CONTROL 75 (2002). The evolutionary framework expounded here can accommodate and enhance
understanding of those factors.
108. I accept Dworkin’s point that law institutionalizes certain values and not others. See DWORKIN,
supra note 5.
109. What is “reflective” about the push and why it “pushes” cannot be detailed in this Article. I remark
only that the process need not be linear and simple, and indeed it seldom is. For an excellent example
of non-linear operation of the push, see Maximo Langer’s analysis of how the principle of universal
jurisdiction over some of the gravest crimes continues to shape domestic and transnational criminal law
and procedure even when the principle appears to be in decline. Maximo Langer, Universal Jurisdiction
Is Not Disappearing: The Shift from ‘Global Enforcer’ to ‘No Safe Haven’ Universal Jurisdiction, in
13 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. (2015). For an excellent argument about the complexity of normativity as it
operates within law, factually negating the explanatory power of accounts that seek the simplicity of
reductionisms — for example the principle of “efficiency” operating in the common law — to explain
the evolution of law, see Frank Michelman, Norms and Normativity in the Economic Theory of Law, 62
MINN. L. REV. 1015 (1978).
110. In what Reale referred to as a dialectic of implication-polarity. See MIGUEL REALE, TEORIA
TRIDIMENSIONAL DODIREITO (5th ed. 2003).
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Legal actors are only able to mediate the tension between functional
adaptation and value orientation in virtue of the paradigm of law in and
through which they think. Legal actors smooth out the corrugation effects
of that tension inasmuch as they act out the terms of the covenant between
will, history, and reason consecrated by a paradigm of law. It is therefore
the structuring effects of paradigms that supply the meaning and
intelligibility that make legal action at all viable, especially so in the form
of the four types of legal explanation discussed in Subsection 1.B. And it is
paradigm-bound legal action that reproduces the structure of the paradigm.
In this double effect rests the structure-agency model that best explains the
evolution of law.
James Coleman offers a model for agent-structure explanation in which
“transition from macro to micro and the transition back to the macro level .
. . can be conceived of as the rules of the game, rules which transmit
consequences of an individual’s action to other individuals and rules that
derive macro-level outcomes from combinations of individuals’ actions.”111
The model is undergirded by a methodological individualism that considers
actors as purposeful (therefore rational in Coleman’s sense of the term)
utility maximizers. Such a model is too simplistic and stifled to capture the
nature of law either in its static or dynamic aspects. Only an adequate theory
of paradigms of law is able to shed light on the manner in which legal actors,
through the different types of legal explanation, think and act out in the
world in ways that inextricably weave together adaptation and aspiration.
Returning to the form of law, its complexity and sophistication is further
reflected in the fact that no enclosed-synchronic or enclosed–diachronic
type of legal thought is able in the long term to keep up, through its own
resources, with powerful coordination pressures and normative aspirations.
Indeed, in the evolutionary dynamic of law, at times functional
responsiveness may leave values behind; at other times, solutions enacted
as law will fall short of the requirements of values. When that happens,
normative destabilization—small or significant—occurs.112 In such
situations, patching is required, and the structured yet textured narratives of
legal history help equip legal actors with resources to do the work of
111. JAMES S. COLEMAN, FOUNDATIONS OF SOCIAL THEORY 19 (1994). The so-called “Coleman’s
Boat” is introduced on pages 8-10.
112. The evolutionary structure expounded in this Article fully accommodates, as part of legal systems
stabilizing translation of adaptive complexity into normativity, “moments” of normative crisis. See, e.g.,
Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1685 (1976). In
an insightful effort to define “poststructuralism,” Bernard Harcourt identifies its core in the “style of
critical reasoning that focuses on the moment of ambiguity in our systems of meaning, as a way to
identify the ethical choices that we make when we overcome the ambiguity and move from
indeterminacy to certainty of belief in our efforts to understand, interpret, and shape our environment.”
See BERNARD HARCOURT, An Answer to the Question: ‘What is Poststructuralism?’ (2007),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=970348 (last visited Oct. 31, 2020). Another
incisive reflection on moments of normative crisis, only this time coming from a different cultural camp,
is MARYANNGLENDON, TRADITIONS IN TURMOIL (2006).
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recalibration of the relationship between function and aspiration in law.
Because of this process, the structure of legal evolution not only
accommodates these changes, but even requires legal actors within it to
seek, identify and react to deep-cutting ambiguities and turmoil, for it is the
actors who are equipped with the tools to process these forces in socially
stabilizing ways.
It is unsurprising then that “law and history is the old, established pair,
whose passions have ebbed and flowed with new interests and renewed
affairs. The Anglo-American story of their relation could be narrated as a
political history, connected with the establishment of the autonomy of law
from politics or sovereignty within seventeenth-century England.” 113 The
narrative structure of legal history facilitates the operations in the mind of
legal actors that keep function and aspiration connected or, in moments
when functionality and axiology fall out of cadence, that reconnects them.
C. Paradigms
In theorizing legal evolution, Hauke Brunkhorst articulates a connection
between the adaptive and normative dimensions of legal revolutions. He
explains legal revolutions as being “triggered” by linguistically expressed
legitimization crises in a context of functional differentiation and class
conflict that occasionally leads to leaping normative learning:
Functional differentiation causes certain social problems which the
systems themselves cannot solve. These problems consist, in
particular, of structural social differences that are latent class
conflicts. . . . Once latent conflicts . . . become manifest within the
political sphere of public debate and the struggle for public law . . . ,
they will routinely lead to a legitimation crisis. A crisis of
legitimization if the trigger of (progressive or regressive) normative
learning processes of the affected society as a whole. In an extreme
case, a crisis of legitimization can cause revolutionary change. The
great legal and constitutional revolutions, therefore, are the
paradigmatic cases of a collective learning that is normative.”114
In this model, legal revolutions “are not the result of gradual or
incremental change that leads to the improvement and growth of the
adaptive capacity of the society, but of rapid, catalytic or revolutionary
change that leads to a new constitutional order.” Once in place, the new
order operates both as “path-opening and path-directing because it
constrains social selection normatively.”115
113. Bernadette Meyler, Law, Literature, and History: The Love Triangle, 5 CALIF. L. REV. 2, 374
(2015).
114. HAUKE BRUNKHORST, CRITICAL THEORY OF LEGAL REVOLUTIONS: EVOLUTIONARY
PERSPECTIVES 59 (2014).
115. Id. (emphasis in the original excluded).
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This aspect of a groundbreaking theory of legal evolution misses three
important elements: one micro, another macro, and a third related to the way
the micro embodies the macro. The micro element is agency, or more
specifically, the precise way in which legal actors, in their daily routines,
constrain “social selection normatively.” For if that selection is not
operationalized by institutionally embedded or institutionally interfacing
legal actors as they go about their businesses, how else is it done?
Brunkhorst correctly identifies the process whereby law, as explained
above, institutionalizes normativity, both routinely and during
transformative or revolutionary moments. In the case of evolutionary leaps,
a new constitutional order codifies progressive or regressive normative
learning.
However, normative learning occurs also at a higher level of abstraction,
one that operates as a precondition of plausibility and intelligibility for the
learning at the level of institutionalization. This macro, highly abstracted
level of normativity I name paradigms of law. Paradigms are abstract
enough to accommodate a range of constitutional designs under them. At
the same time, paradigms of law have an institutional vocation: they are
abstractions of eminently institutionalizable normativity. Paradigms of law
possess vast yet limited affordability. In other words, paradigms of law are
carved at the highest levels of enclosing-diachronic legal thought, capable
still of decantation all the way down to afford from new constitutional
codifications to being operationalized by legal actors as they produce,
interpret, enforce, and make claims in law. This is the most important way
in which the micro embodies the macro in law.
§
There have been only two paradigms of law in the entire history of high-
complexity societies: The Great Manifold and The Great Alliance
paradigms.
The Great Manifold did not fully consolidate until the thirteenth century,
in the wake of the philosophical, demographic, economic, institutional,
cultural, political, geopolitical, cognitive, technological, self-referential,
and communicative transformations that marked the High Middle Ages in
Western Europe.116 This paradigm of law brought into a compelling
jurisprudential manifold the following: revealed divine will, the will of
princes and popes, the will of urban elites in city-states, instrumental,
cognitive and normative rationalities, the reception of Aristotelian
philosophy, and the historical legacies of ius particulare, Roman law and
canon law.
116. I am grateful to Julia Barrozo for research on factors that coalesced as the tipping point of
complexity in the thirteenth century.
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The intellectual hero of The Great Manifoldwas Thomas Aquinas, whose
classical natural law theory enshrined the triadic will-history-reason nature
of law in such a mode as to allow it to coexist with intense religiosity of the
type our general culture no longer has access to. The cornerstone of the
paradigm is a concept of law as a kaleidoscope of normativity,117 resulting
in a system presented as the complete ordering of all things. This ordering
of all things is achieved by interlocking four types of law—eternal, natural,
human, and divine—differentiated by the wills that enact them, their proper
jurisdiction, and the mode and stringency of their efficacy.118
Aquinas defines eternal law as divine will’s rule over “the whole
community of the universe . . . by Divine Reason.”119 Eternal law includes
all laws of nature ruling over the entire realm of physis. The laws of nature
have absolute efficacy, as nothing can escape them except per special divine
dispensation in the form, for example, of miracles. Nature, passive and
unconscious, blindly submits to its governing laws, and in so doing displays
the normativity of God’s reason.
In contrast to the universal jurisdiction of eternal law over nature, natural
law has jurisdiction solely over humankind. It is, strictly speaking, still a
subsystem of eternal law, albeit a specialized one for it commands upon
legal subjects that, unlike the rest of nature, are active and conscious.
Humanity’s agency is explained by its limited yet significant partaking in
God’s rational attributes: “the rational creature is subject to divine
providence in the most excellent way. . . . [w]herefore it has a share of the
eternal reason.”120Natural law is a discovery of practical reason and binding
in human conscience, as required by a humanity whose comprehension of
the divine is only deep enough to develop a conscious awareness of human
117. Following a pre-Socratic tradition of distinguishing physis and nomos, Aristotle had already
problematized the bipartite nature of political justice: one part natural, the other conventional. In Book
V of Nicomachean Ethics, one reads that “Of political justice part is natural, part legal.” ARISTOTLE,
NICOMACHEANETHICS, 1134b (W.D. Ross trans., Princeton Univ. Press 1995). One would have to wait
until the Renaissance for the divine to release humankind to subjection solely to its own normative
scheme. See, e.g., Pico della Mirandola: “We have given you, Oh Adam; no visage proper to yourself,
nor any endowment properly your own, in order that whatever place, whatever form, whatever gifts you
may, with premeditation, select, these same you may have and possess through your own judgment and
decision. The nature of all other creatures is defined and restricted within laws which We have laid
down; you, by contrast, impeded by no such restrictions, may, by your own free will, to whose custody
We have assigned you, trace for yourself the lineaments of your own nature. I have placed you at the
very center of the world. . . . We have made you a creature neither of heaven nor of earth, either mortal
nor immortal, in order that you may, as the free and proud shaper of your own being, fashion yourself
in the form you may prefer. It will be in your power to descend to the lower, brutish forms of life; you
will be able, through your own decision, to rise again to the superior orders whose life is divine.”
GIOVANNI PICO DELLA MIRANDOLA, ORATION ON THE DIGNITY OF MAN 7-8 (A. Robert Caponigri
trans., Henry Regnery 1956) (1496). Aquinas’s kaleidoscopic normativity stands between Aristotle’s
and della Mirandola’s.
118. I here draw from a relatively more detailed study of Aquinas’s natural law in Barrozo, supra note
106. I now work on an expanded version of that study.
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imperfections in comparison to divine perfection. Natural law comes to the
assistance of fundamentally imperfect creatures who nonetheless long for
the good. It is precisely humanity’s use of rational faculties to discover
norms that directs agency toward the common good, which uncovers the
natural laws of humanity—”and this participation of the eternal law in the
rational creature is called the natural law.”121 Thus it is the “imprint” on
people of a “divine light” that entrusts in them, as the rational segment of
God’s creation, co-responsibility for the government of the cosmos
according to the good. In their possession and use of this natural reason,
individuals join God as active participants in the government through law
of the universe, although restricted to a small but all-important segment of
it: human society. God-speech is law because God speaks only law. His
rational creation shares this attribute.
In the natural association of individuals into societies, argues Aquinas,
humanity exists as a ruled species; ruled, however, by itself, as co-author
with God of the law under which it lives. Now, although natural law binds
in conscience, conscience is imperfect. Thus, though universally valid, the
efficacy of natural law makes room—as all significant natural law doctrines
before and after Aquinas do—for anomie. The imperfection of human
conscience enters in two ways. First, as with any higher-level normative
system, the generality and universality of the precepts of natural law require
both (meaning) determination and (application) particularization, what
much later generations lumped under the idea of law’s relative
indeterminacy. As meaning specification and particular application are
operations of fallible human reason, the second cause for potential anomie
lies in the interference of passions upon reason, a reminder of humankind’s
inescapable animal nature, a point that Kant would later pick up on.
Now enters human law (positive law)122 as a remedy for the imperfections
of human reason’s understanding of and compliance with natural law. As it
concerns this Article, positive law is how history enters the kaleidoscopic,
gapless normative system of the cosmos. Yet human law is derivative of
natural law as a logical “conclusion from premises” or as a “determination
of certain generalities.”123 This is what later generations would name
formalism. Rationally derivative, positive law is a bounded exercise of
practical reason. Accordingly, reason remains irreducibly imbricated in the
ontology of law. Positive law is thus a human artifact in the service of
natural law cognition, voluntary compliance, and enforcement. However,
just as natural law suffers from human imperfections, so does positive law.
Indeed, and by definition, positive law is fallible rationality applied to
mundane affairs. Consequently, it can only aim at a form of perfectibility
121. Id.
122. Id. at question 91, art. 3.
123. Id. at question 95, art. 2.
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open to “its own particular genus.”124
Moreover, in Aquinas’ system positive law cannot and should not cover
the entire catalogue of human vices, but only those carrying grave social
consequences.125 The vices to be repressed by positive law are those
affecting the common good, that is, those with a public implication. All
vices with private consequences only (or primarily) are to be left alone by
positive law. These fall into the proper domain of divine law, the fourth kind
of law in Aquinas’s jurisprudence. The central point about divine law is that
it is divine will mediated by revelation as collated in sacred scripture.
Divine law offers knowledge not achieved or even achievable by human
reason. Revealed by God through prophets and enshrined in sacred
scripture, divine law cannot possibly err. Therefore, divine law, which is
universal in reach, can offer untainted insight into the nature of goodness
and unimpeachable certainty about which practices and intentions have
redeeming value.
Under the weight of Aquinas’s authority and influence, The Great
Manifold paradigm created the conditions for functional adaptation and
axiological steering over centuries of great horizontal and vertical political
power dispersion and then rapid consolidation—all in a culture profoundly
religious and compounded by demographic, geographic, cultural and
economic, etc. complexification. In doing so, it welded will, reason and
history in a way that is compatible with the personal experience of faith, the
cultural, economic and political importance of religion, and the myriad
ways that local and supra-local, secular and religious orders interfaced. The
Great Manifold paradigm made it possible for legal actors to experience
thinking and acting in the practical tasks of daily life as if doing so with a
view to assist humanity—naturally committed to the common good and
“ordained” to the end of eternal happiness—in God’s plan through the
medium of law.
The Great Manifold reigned sovereign for centuries, and remains in the
marrow of The Great Alliance paradigm, as evidenced by the resurgence
about every other generation of versions of natural law. It came under
practical and intellectual attacks that proved ultimately successful only
starting in the Renaissance and throughout the Enlightenment, especially
under the considerable strain of the Thirty Years War and its political
aftermath. Early initiatives, such as Henry VIII’s interdiction of the teaching
of canon law and Thomist philosophy at Oxford and Cambridge in the
sixteenth century, did nothing to challenge the authority of The Great
Manifold. All they did was contribute to the stunting—felt to this day—of
the conceptual development of the common law.126 The Great Manifold
124. Id. at question 91, art. 3.
125. Id. at question 96, art. 2.
126. This is despite the efforts of English “civilians” then and after. See the account in Daniel
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fully collapsed only under the weight of the polarization of the legal
historicism and legal rationalism of the eighteenth century. Yet The Great
Alliance paradigm crystalized only in the nineteenth century, and its own
settlement of will, reason, and history rests on the evolutionary
achievements of the previous paradigm.
The Great Alliance continues to preside over the thought and experience
of law today.127 Its greatest intellectual feat was to bring together the
previously polarized historicist and rationalist currents in legal thought. Its
intellectual heroes were Hegel and Savigny.128 It enshrined the ideas now
familiar to us: national constitutions; popular sovereignty with
institutionally channeled popular participation in law and politics; tripartite
division of state powers; the availability of safe institutional channels to
contest authority;129 markets legally constituted under conceptions of free
contracting, protected property, and fair transactions; individual and
collective rights as mechanisms to recognize and protect values embodied
in persons and groups; and institutionalized private and public competition,
cooperation, and conflict.
The principal mechanism of The Great Alliance was a compact between
not only legal rationalism and historicism, but also that to which will
acceded (with will now understood fundamentally as popular will). By the
end of the eighteenth century, legal rationalism and historicism were
polarized more than ever before. This polarization was largely due to the
reception of the French Revolution across theWestern Hemisphere. Against
this backdrop, the legal rationalism of Hegel conceptualized the historicity
of law as the outcome of the cunning operation of reason in the world, or as
Emerson saw it, “of the works of this mind history is the record.”130 At the
same time, the legal historicism of Savigny appealed to legal reason in order
Coquillette’s grand quadrilogy Legal Ideology and Incorporation (I-IV) published in the volumes 61
and 67 of the Boston Univ. Law Review in the 1980’s. Maitland saw the loss for medieval English law
in escaping being taken over by the Roman law tradition more than compensated for by keeping abbey
the autocratic stem that runs in that tradition as he saw it. The influence of his opinion on the matter is
essential to explain the persistence of the conceptual delay I mention here. See FREDERICK WILLIAM
MAITLAND, THEHISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW BEFORE THE TIME OF EDWARD I (2010).
127. I devote relatively less space to The Great Alliance as it was detailed in previous work. I also spare
the reader the analysis of how the works of Savigny and Hegel cemented the paradigm for the same
reason. I again refer the reader to Paulo Barrozo, The Great Alliance: History, Reason, and Will in
Modern Law, 78 LAW&CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS 235 (2015).
128. See FRIEDRICH KARL VON SAVIGNY, ON THE VOCATION OF OUR AGE FOR LEGISLATION AND
JURISPRUDENCE (A. Hayward trans., [publisher] [year]) (1831); 1 FRIEDRICH KARL VON SAVIGNY,
SYSTEM OF THE MODERN ROMAN LAW (Holloway trans., Hyperion Press 1993) (1867); and HEGEL,
supra note 22.
129. The idea of institutionalized Socratic contestation, “a practice that gives institutional expression to
the idea that all legitimate authority depends on being grounded in public reasons, that is, justifiable to
others on grounds they might reasonably accept.” Mattias Kumm, Institutionalising Socratic
Contestation: The Rationalist Human Rights Paradigm, Legitimate Authority and the Point of Judicial
Review, 1 EUR. J. LEGAL STUD. no. 2, 2008, at [starting page of article], 155.
130.RALPHWALDOEMERSON,History, in THEESSENTIALWRITINGS OFRALPHWALDOEMERSON 113,
114 (2000).
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to scientifically (as legal science) capture and conceptually stabilize legal
historical matter.
The resulting intellectual rapprochement of rationalism and historicism
was so compelling, prestigious and authoritative that the ruled masses could
hardly resist buying into it. The accession of popular will to the compact is
the root of whatever stability as constant change that modern societies
achieved. Since then, modern law and the main schools of enclosed legal
explanation have remained bound to this convergence of reason and history
in the face of will. Even the enclosing-diachronicmodel of legal explanation
embodied in grand legal history unfolds within The Great Alliance
paradigm.
As constitutional essentials131 were carved onto modern institutional
imagination by The Great Alliance, legal thought towards the end of the
nineteenth and by the beginning of the twentieth centuries became
increasingly devoted to retooling the law to meet the perceived needs of the
age and its rising social groups. 132 From then on, good law was considered
that which worked as an efficient means to deal with functional adaptive
problems, producing social coordination out of the increasing complexity
of social challenges. But the real action was in solving problems in ways
that were compatible with the values codified by the axiological axis of The
Great Alliance.
The bracketing of wholesale questioning of constitutional essentials was
therefore rendered plausible by two factors: first, the imaginative authority
of the constitutional settlement of The Great Alliance; and second, the
urgency with which novel tail-wind adaptive pressures demanded legal
institutional responsiveness, leaving little time for institutional or
axiological “big thinking.” For the legal actors who inhabit and constantly
act out The Great Alliance, the background intellectual environment for the
evolution of law as a social problem-solving instrument was already firmly
in place—as “the conditions for evolution are a product of evolution”133—
by the end of the nineteenth century, as exemplified in the works of Holmes
and Jhering.134
The Great Manifold and The Great Alliance paradigms set, first in legal
thought and then in law, the terms for the coexistence through law of
stability and change in high-complexity societies.
Any successful paradigm of law must perform normative, functional, and
131. To use Rawls’s felicitous expression. See RAWLS, supra note 13.
132. “The debates are over. Controversies over great ideas have subsided. The scene is finally dominated
by those whom Oliver Wendell Holmes long suspected to be mere businessmen. Law is a trade. If you
are smart and know how to enact your craft, the forthcoming financial rewards will be sizeable. You’d
better adapt.” Alexander Somek, The Spirit of Legal Positivism, 12 GERMAN L.J. 729, 729 (2011).
133. NIKLAS LUHMANN, LAW AS A SOCIAL SYSTEM 243 (K. Ziegert trans., Oxford Univ. Press 2004).
134. For an excellent study of legal instrumentalism in various areas of contemporary United States law
and its risks and consequences, see BRIAN TAMANAHA, LAW AS AMEANS TO AN END (2006).
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explanatory tasks. Normatively, a paradigmmust offer a vision for how will,
history, and reason converge in law as an axiologically legitimate
institution. Functionally, a paradigm must facilitate the resolution of
society’s coordination problems in directions deemed to be normatively
legitimate. The explanatory task is to create the conditions of possibility for
all enclosed types of legal explanation. The cumulative result of the
performance of these tasks is the softening of the tension between
adaptation and aspiration, thus sufficiently integrating for the relevant legal
actors, as well as social actors in general, the ontology, axiology, causation,
authorship, concept and meaning of law through the form of law.135
Paradigms of law are necessarily carved at a high level of abstraction.
When they fly close to the ground, they do so, for example, as legal
formalism.136 Starting in earnest by the end of the nineteenth century,
formalism underwent relentless criticism, with each generation of jurists
aiming to surpass the previous one’s anti-formalist credentials. Failing to
comprehend the varieties of formalism and the essential role of formalism
in high-complexity societies—and the critical-constructive potential
formalism holds—anti-formalism generalized an ephebic, caricatured
version of formalism—call it formulaic formalism—as formalism tout
court.137 Often succumbing to the strawman fallacy, critiques of formalism
both described and idealized law not as conceptual symphony, but as jazzy
improvisation, thus easily falling into the arms of consequentialisms,
135. Much more would need to be said to show, as Habermas attempted to do, that “the normative
defeatism to which both lines [action-theoretic and systems theory] of political sociology lead is not
simply a result of sobering evidence but of misguided conceptual strategies as well. These strategies
lose sight of what political power owes specifically to its formal constitution in legal terms.”
HABERMAS, supra note 102, at 330. That is left for another context.
136. The literature on legal formalism is enormous. Sociologically, the form of law is neither desirable
nor undesirable; form is the vessel in which sophisticated legal orders travel, and formalism is the
attitude of the lawyers who travel with it. It is through the form of law that adaptation and value-
orientation are processed together, and formalism is the attitude of legal actors that operate the
processing. The formalist attitude manifests itself in a spectrum from the more reflective to the more
formulaic. The only cogent critique of formalism is the critique of formulaic formalism. For fruitful
studies see, in addition to other sources cited elsewhere, Frederick Schauer, Formalism, 97 YALE L.J.
509 (1988); ERNEST J. WEINRIB, THE IDEA OF PRIVATE LAW (1995); ROBERTOMANGABEIRA UNGER,
THE CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES MOVEMENT (1986); Martin Stone, Formalism, in THE OXFORD
HANDBOOK OF JURISPRUDENCE AND PHILOSOPHY OF LAW (Jules Coleman & Scott J. Shapiro eds.,
Oxford Univ. Press 2004); and MARTTIKOSKENNIEMI, THEGENTLECIVILIZER OFNATIONS (2004).
137. Not to mention the difficult conciliation in critical legal thought of a critique of formalism and
systemic or structural critique of law. Karl Klare thus describes the difficulty: “The radical critics’
problem, of course, is that the antiformalist critique constantly collides with and undermines the
structuralist perspective. Structural or systemic theories, whether critical or apologetic, seem to require
some version of formalism, some claim or assumption that legal orders have an in-built structure (given
either by their core philosophical principles or by functional attributes of the social system) that locks
in routine legal decision-making. One cannot convincingly attribute observed regularities in legal
outcomes to basic systemic principles or functions without at the same time providing some account of
the structural constraints on routine legal decision-making. Yet the antiformalist impulse aims precisely
to show the pervasiveness of contingency, choice, and personal responsibility in the legal process. It
therefore renders problematical all claims of structural constraint.” Karl E. Klare, Social Construction
and System in Legal Theory: A Response to Professor Preuss, in 12 GERMAN L.J. 1 (2011).
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pragmatisms, and functionalisms of sundry types.
In the post-legal realist age in Europe and the Americas, pointing to
formalism as of the essence of law in complex societies may be seen as
adventure in staled orthodoxy. This mistake brings to mind the insight that
Borges put in the mind of a conservative—”the heresies we ought to fear
are those that can be confused with orthodoxy.”138
To briefly recover the significance of formalism—and to set aside the
strawman of formulaic formalism—I introduce the notion of critical-
constructive formalism. Rather than rejecting the inherent tension between
functional adaptation and the structural integrity that is usually attributed to
formalism, critical-constructive formalism embraces the tension by
elevating it to its proper intellectual and practical significance. Critical-
constructive formalism explains the form of law as a fundamental element
of the conceptual integrity of law understood in its historicist, rationalist,
and voluntarist roots.
All that said, the ultimate test for paradigms of law rests in their
resilience. They are also tested on their ability to answer questions about
the epistemic status of thinking normatively about an object—law—the
phenomenology of which includes past-willed commands to guide present
behavior into future outcomes. That is why any successful paradigm of law
must incorporate a hermeneutic of normative practices from the viewpoint
of social actors, and thus constantly recreating law both as the foundation
and as the apex of normative praxis.
It may be helpful now to inventory the static and dynamic features of the
theory of legal evolution outlined in this Article.
❖ Legal systems of high-complexity societies are composed of
elements that are integrated from the viewpoint of relevant legal
actors by functional, axiological, formal, and hierarchical
considerations.
❖ Legal systems are ceaselessly under attack by functional and
axiological pressures that create risks of social destabilization.
Risks of destabilization refer to functional or axiological factors
that cannot be accommodated without normative change—small or
large—in the relevant sector of the legal system. Lack of normative
change in such cases may generate anomaly, inefficiency,
illegitimacy or unresponsiveness that may accumulate or
degenerate into destabilization crisis potentially reaching the level
of social change as social instability.
❖ Paradigms of law operate as intelligibility conditions of legal action
and thought, and legal actors reproduce a paradigm by thinking
with and through it and by acting it out in the world. In the domain
138. Jorge Luis Borges, The Theologians, in THE ALEPH AND OTHER STORIES (Andrew Hurley trans.,
Penguin Classics 2004)
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of law, paradigm is structuring because it holds the capacity to
intellectually integrate will, history and reason at the enclosing-
diachronic level of explanation, which generates descending levels
of explanation capabilities all the way to the enclosed-synchronic
level of everyday doctrine. In worldly sites of legal production,
interpretation and enforcement, paradigms of law allow legal actors
ordinarily to weave together, in the small confines of their roles,
functional and axiological responsiveness in ways that are
sufficiently efficient and legitimizing. This process collectively
and routinely stabilizes legal systems that are under constant risk of
social destabilization. Legal history plays an important role in this
process of stabilization.
❖ The greater a destabilization risk, the higher up in the hierarchy of
formal sources and further up in the modes of legal explanation
legal actors must reach. The escalation of the viewpoint-scope-
timeframe of legal explanation may at times be a match to the need
for change of meta-norms of conflict resolution, usually
accompanied by changes in the constitutional essentials. Twice in
the past, escalation reached the point of paradigm formation.
CONCLUSION
I offered an extended argument to support the conclusion that legal
history, especially of the grand narrative type, should, to avoid unrealized
explanatory potential, reflectively adopt a general theory of the nature of
law and its evolution as part of its methodological commitments. In the case
of highly complex societies, any explanation of law in time would fall short
without an understanding of how adaptation and aspiration interact. And no
actor-centered interpretive historiographical account of law in time is
warranted without an understanding of how paradigms of law allow actors
to find meaning and solutions within a system of law.
For that purpose, and with grand legal history in mind, I outlined one such
theory of the nature of law and its evolution. A secondary argument was
that legal history—apologetic or critical, record-setting or sage, specific or
sweeping—plays facilitative roles in the stabilization of high-complexity
societies.
At the end, legal history emerges doubly burdened. Here is why.
High-complexity societies, as I have argued, are vessels sustaining
relentless functional (and largely axiologically) blind tailwind coordination
pressures. By itself, responsiveness to coordination stresses seems capable
of integrating and adapting societies for some time. However, long-term
social coordination, and consequently social stability, requires a trailblazing
normative edge that filters and translates functionality into normativity, and
stability into order. This is because trailblazing normative edges provide
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embedded social actors with justificatory capabilities to dislocate raw
power from social interaction and problem-solving. This dislocation works
by selecting which adaptive pressures will receive a response as well as
which kinds of responses there will be. Furthermore, axiological pressures
are themselves sometimes at the origin of functional pressures.
For example, the twentieth century showed that solutions offered to
address housing shortages ranged from the laissez-faire “let-markets-sort-
it-out,” to forced mass relocation, to the constitutional enshrinement of a
social right to housing. It were the normative edges of the respective legal
systems that steered solutions in one direction rather than in the competing
directions.
Under the aegis of legal systems, the stability of high-complexity
societies does not depend—as simpler societies once did in comparative
terms—on social stasis through normative inertia. On the contrary, high-
complexity societies can only achieve social stability as constant functional
adaptation and axiological responsiveness through the kind of small
quotidian and large occasional normative changes that legal systems
evolved to institutionalize.
Thus evolved, legal systems render social complexity normative.
Considered in their static state, the elements of the evolutionary framework
—formal sources of law, institutions, functional adaptive pressures,
axiological orientation, paradigms of legal thought, and actors—unfold
dynamically in a rough historical path. Paradigms of law succeed—when
they do—in the task of smoothing out that path in virtue of the appeal of
their axiological axes, of their ability to accommodate efficient solutions,
and of their explanation-generative powers, whereby the highest form of
legal explanation decants all the way down to quotidian legal doctrine in the
hands of countless legal actors, each narrowly positioned somewhere in
their large legal systems.
Sheltered under The Great Manifold or, later, under The Great Alliance,
the form of law codified as legal doctrine the welding of adaptive solutions
and values that embedded legal actors had been socialized to deem
attractive. As legal actors walk the ground of their legal systems, forms of
legal explanation lubricate, including by obfuscation effects, the overall
evolutionary structure. Grand legal history achieves its full explanatory
potential when grounded in a theory able to account for these phenomena.
Therefore, its first burden is to acquire such grounding.
The second burden is elective, as it is one of self-understanding. No legal
system, and helpful as they might be, no enclosed-synchronic or enclosed–
diachronic type of legal thought, are able to keep up in the long term,
through its own resources, with powerful coordination pressures and
normative aspirations. Enclosed types of legal explanation are unable on
their own to stabilize society as normative change due to a recurrent lack of
43
Barrozo: Law in Time: Legal Theory and Legal History
Published by Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository,
2021] Law in Time 361
sufficient integration between functional adaptation and the axiological
steering afforded at their limited level of abstraction. Such situations are
potentially destabilizing of societies. When they occur, legal systems
benefit from the narratives of legal history to equip legal actors with
resources to restore the cadence between function and aspiration in law.
In this role, grand legal history caters to the demands of significant, and
yet bounded, reflectivity inherent in paradigms of legal thought. In other
words, legal history contributes to paradigm endurance and operation in the
evolution of law. Much hinges on legal history’s ability to continue to play
this role. If anything, it should get better at it. Therefore, it is appropriate,
albeit not necessary, for legal history, especially for grand legal history, to
understand and own the role it plays in social stability through normative
change; to understand that it is an insider, a part of the history of how law
evolves to create and sustain social order.139
To understand and own its role might haunt grand legal history in a way
common to all enclosing explanations in the humanities. Bernard Williams
referred to it as the “problem of reflection versus commitment.”140 For
critical historians in particular, does reflective understanding of how their
narratives fit in the production of social stability as social order sabotage
their commitment to the enterprise of legal history?
A burden, however, is not necessarily a problem. To see this double
burden as problematic presupposes a state of vocational enchantment. It
presupposes that one would endure the travails of the historiographical craft
only if acting under the belief that legal history necessarily has iconoclastic
or revolutionary effects. Such a state of vocational enchantment, if it exists,
does not befit the gravitas of coming to an understanding of the theoretical
requirements of legal history and of how legal history serves the evolution
of law, and of carrying on with the craft nonetheless.
139. ”Do consider the possibility, indeed the probability, that we are in a story, and collect yourself a
bit,” as Thomas Mann had Joseph remind his lover. THOMASMANN, JOSEPH AND HIS BROTHERS, 954
(J. E. Woods trans., Alfred A. Knopf 2005).
140. Bernard Williams, Philosophy as a Humanistic Discipline, in 294 PHILOSOPHY 75, 490.
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